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INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organi-
zations Act (RICO)I as part of Title IX of the Organized Crime Con-
trol Act of 1970.2 The primary purpose of the Organized Crime
Control Act was to eradicate organized crime in the United States.
3
Congress drafted RICO specifically to provide a more effective
means of combatting organized crime through new remedies and
enhanced sanctions that Congress mandated "be liberally construed
to effectuate ... remedial purposes."
4
The RICO statute codifies civil and criminal provisions in the
United States criminal code.5 Section 1961 defines "racketeering
activity" by listing specific state and federal crimes.6 The enumer-
ated crimes are called predicate crimes because, if two or more are
committed, a RICO claim can be based upon them.7 In the early
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988).
2. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941 (1970).
3. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922-23 (statement of Findings and Purpose) (codified at
18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1988)); see Jost, Justices Uphold Broad RICO Use Against Business: Marginal
Change, L.A. Daily J., June 27, 1989, at 1, col. 2 (recognizing RICO enacted at time when
public concern about "infiltration of organized crime into legitimate businesses and labor
unions" was intense).
4. Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947 (1970); see Russello v. United States, 464
U.S. 16, 26-27 (1983) (citing Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a) as only federal criminal statute
containing liberal directive language); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 591 (1981)
(interpreting Congress' intent to apply RICO to both legitimate and illegitimate
"enterprises").
5. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1961-1968
(1988).
6. Id. § 1961(1)(A)-(E); see also infra text accompanying note 29 (listing crimes).
7. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS
(RICO): A MANUAL FOR FEDERAL PROSECUTORS 6 (2d rev. ed. 1988) [hereinafter U.S. DEP'T OF
JUST. RICO MANUAL] (noting that subtle linguistic shifts in § 1961 allow certain conspiracies
to serve as predicate acts); see also United States v. Manzella, 782 F.2d 533, 537 (5th Cir.)
(holding that predicate acts required to constitute pattern of racketeering), cert. denied, 476
U.S. 1123 (1986); United States v. Pepe, 747 F.2d 632, 645 (11 th Cir. 1984) (noting that to
establish pattern of racketeering at least two predicate acts are required); United States v.
Ruggiero, 726 F.2d 913, 918 (2d Cir.) (finding conspiracy appropriate predicate act), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 831 (1984).
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1970s, commentators hailed the criminal provisions of RICO as
"the new darling of the prosecutor's nursery." By the early 1980s,
however, critics were charging that civil RICO provisions were over-
used and misdirected. 9 In particular, the inclusion of mail, wire, and
securities fraud as predicate acts 10 is often blamed for the explosive
use of RICO over the past ten years." The availability of these
commercial fraud predicates to establish a RICO violation allows
plaintiffs and prosecutors to extend civil RICO beyond its intended
purpose' 2 and to use it against established businesses, including
law, banking, and insurance firms.13
A liberal construction of the statute's broad language means not
only that the discretion to invoke RICO remains with prosecutors
and plaintiffs' lawyers,14 but also that the courts must define RICO's
scope and prevent its abuse.' 5 In 1985, the Supreme Court's dicta
8. Tarlow, RICO: The New Darling of the Prosecutor's Nursery, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 165, 169
(1980) (referring to recent expanded use and broadened construction of RICO statute); see
Blakey, Study of Allegations of Litigation Abuse, 5 Civil RICO Rep. (BNA) No. 4, at 5 (June 20,
1989) (noting that, in 1970s, United States Department of Justice (DOJ) moved slowly in
using RICO's criminal provisions and even more slowly in using its civil provisions, but that
today RICO is prosecutor's tool of choice in combatting particular crimes).
9. See Comment, The Enterprise Requirement: Getting to the Heart of Civil RICO, 1988 Wis. L.
REV. 663, 664 & n.5 (contending that Congress never anticipated such expansive application
of RICO provisions).
10. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A)-(E) (1988) (enumerating predicate crimes); Financial In-
stitutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 968, 103
Stat. 183, 506 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) to include bank fraud as RICO predicate
offense).
11. See Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 501 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(identifying mail and wire fraud as "single most significant reason for the expansive use of
civil RICO" and noting that, before RICO, no federal law provided private damage remedies
based on these violations); see also Crovitz, R-I-CO and the Man, REASON, Mar. 1990, at 27, col.
2 (observing that "[n]early half of the private civil RICO cases rely solely on allegations of
mail or wire fraud and another third rely primarily on allegations of securities fraud.").
12. See Comment, supra note 9, at 667 (maintaining that civil RICO used in settings not
anticipated by drafters); see also DeConcini Rdects Suggestion that RICO Reform Bill is "Done Deal",
5 Civil RICO Rep. (BNA) No. 3, at 4 (June 13, 1989) (noting that many practitioners and
scholars agree that civil RICO is abused) [hereinafter DeConcini Rejects Suggestion]; Mansnerus,
As Racketeering Law Expands, So Does Pressure to Rein It In, N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 1989, at 1, col. 1
(acknowledging RICO was intended to "bring broader powers to bear against criminals who
had proved to be difficult to prosecute"). But see Blakey, supra note 8, at 6 (arguing that critics
of civil RICO overestimate litigation abuse).
13. Harrison, Look Who's Using RICO, A.B.A.J., Feb. 1989, at 56, col. I (recognizing that
RICO has upset "rules of the game" in areas of labor, employment, and bankruptcy law);
DeConcini Reects Suggestion, supra note 12, at 4 (expressing concern that increasing number of
lender liability suits will have negative impact on small businesses dependent on community
banks for loans); Mansnerus, supra note 12, at 1, col. 1 (stating businesses, securities dealers,
and accountants are most frequent targets of civil RICO).
14. See Comment, supra note 9, at 667 (positing that RICO provisions create army of
private attorneys general). But see 9 UNrrED STATES ATORNEYS' MANUAL, §§ 9-110.200-.320
(1984) (limiting prosecutorial discretion by creating authority in DOJ's Organized Crime &
Racketeering Section to review proposed indictments pursuant to detailed guidelines).
15. D. SMrrH & T. REED, CIVIL RICO 4.01, at 4-4 (1988) (interpreting Sedima dicta as
requiring lower courts to develop meaningful standards to limit abuse of civil RICO).
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in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co. 16 suggested that courts could limit the
scope of RICO's application by narrowing the definitions of RICO's
key elements, "person," "enterprise," and "pattern of racketeering
activity."' 17 The Sedima language triggered a debate among the cir-
cuit courts about how the pattern element is established.' Five
tests emerged, each attempting to define RICO's pattern element.' 9
The Eighth Circuit's multiple schemes test, however, was the most
stringent.20 Predictably, a case originating in the Eighth Circuit
provided an opportunity for the Supreme Court to establish a defi-
nite standard. 2'
In H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co.,22 the Court formu-
lated a test to determine the existence of a RICO pattern of racke-
teering.23 Under this test, two or more predicate acts comprising
the pattern must: 1) be related to each other or to "some external
organizing principle," and 2) amount to continuous criminal activity
or pose a threat of continued criminal activity.24 The H.J. Inc. test
eliminates the need to show that the racketeering predicates were
committed to further multiple criminal schemes. 25 According to the
Court, multiple predicates committed to further a single illegal
scheme may be sufficient to form the requisite "pattern of racketeer-
ing activity."
26
This Comment analyzes the Supreme Court's decision in H.J. Inc.,
focusing on the test the Court formulated to define a RICO pattern.
16. 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
17. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 n.14 (1985). The majority focused
on the definition of "pattern of racketeering activity" and held that, although two acts are
necessary to establish a pattern, two isolated acts may not be sufficient. Id.
18. Although beyond the scope of this Comment, Sedima also created a split of authority
among the lower courts over the "enterprise" requirement. For a thorough discussion of the
"enterprise" requirement, see Comment, The RICO Enterprise as Distinct from the Pattern of Rack-
eteering Activity: Clarifying the Minority View, 62 TUL. L. REV. 1419, 1424-47 (1988) (examining
nexus between "enterprise" and "pattern of racketeering activity"); Comment, supra note 9,
at 677-91 (analyzing components of RICO "enterprise" requirement); U.S. DEP'T oF JUST.
RICO MANUAL, supra note 7, at 25-34 (identifying types of "enterprises").
19. See infra notes 44-67 and accompanying text (examining multiple scheme, Blockburger,
totality of circumstances, Blockburger enhanced, and Sedima tests).
20. See infra notes 46-49 and accompanying text (describing application of Eighth Cir-
cuit's multiple schemes test).
21. HJ. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 648 F. Supp. 419 (D. Minn. 1986), aff'd, 829
F.2d 648 (8th Cir. 1987), rev'd and remanded, 109 5. Ct. 2893 (1989); see Franklin, Redefining
RICO: High Court Gets Opportunity to Clarify "Pattern of Activity, " N.Y.LJ., Nov. 3, 1988, at 5, col.
2 (announcing that H.J. Inc. will have major impact on RICO use).
22. 109 S. Ct. 2893 (1989).
23. H.J. Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2900; see infra notes 94-98 and accompanying text (articulating
two-pronged continuity plus relationship test); see also notes 109-18 and accompanying text
(elaborating requirements of continuity prong).
24. H.J. Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2900.
25. Id. at 2901.
26. Id. at 2902.
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Part I presents an overview of RICO's pattern requirement and dis-
cusses Sedima, the first Supreme Court decision to address it. Fur-
ther, Part I identifies the five tests developed in the circuit courts to
determine the existence of a RICO pattern before H.J. Inc. Part II
reviews the facts, procedural history, and holding of H.J. Inc. Part
III explores the contours of the H.J. Inc. Court's pattern test and
addresses Justice Scalia's concern that RICO may be unconstitution-
ally vague. Part III also identifies the significant consequences of
the Court's decision by analyzing post-H.J. Inc. pattern decisions.
Part IV describes the most recent congressional efforts to amend
RICO. Part V identifies five options to limit RICO, examines lan-
guage used in state "little" RICO statutes, and proposes a new stat-
utory definition of pattern that captures the concept of continuing
illegal activity. This Comment concludes that legislative action is
needed to narrow the definition of pattern in order to restrict
RICO's scope to a more traditional notion of organized crime.
I. BACKGROUND
A. An Overview of the Pattern Requirement in RICO
The definition of "pattern of racketeering activity" is extremely
important because it is a key element of each substantive civil and
criminal offense RICO creates. 27 Section 1961(5) states that a "pat-
tern of racketeering activity" "requires" that at least two acts of
"racketeering activity" occur within a ten-year period. 28 Offenses
that may constitute "racketeering activity" include the crimes of
27. Federal RICO creates three substantive crimes: 1) using income derived from a pat-
tern of racketeering to acquire an interest in an "enterprise"; 2) acquiring or maintaining an
interest in an "enterprise" through a pattern of racketeering; and 3) conducting the affairs of
an "enterprise" through a "pattern of racketeering activity." 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(c) (1988).
Additionally, conspiring to commit any of these three offenses is also unlawful under federal
RICO. Id. § 1962(d).
28. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1988). Section 1961(5) defines "pattern of racketeering activ-
ity" as "at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date
of this chapter and the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding any period of impris-
onment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity." Id. The Supreme Court
held that the language in both the civil and the criminal provisions requires consistent con-
struction. See Hj. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 109 S. Ct. 2893, 2899 (1989) (noting
pattern requirement applies to both criminal and civil RICO cases); Russello v. United States,
464 U.S. 16, 20 (1983) (maintaining that even when language is ambiguous, it must be re-
garded as conclusive if no contrary legislative directive is available) (citing United States v.
Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981)). The statute requires that one predicate act be commit-
ted after the effective date of RICO, excluding any period of imprisonment. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961(5) (1988). In this way, RICO avoids violating the ex post facto clause of the Constitu-
tion, even though some predicates may have occurred before the statute's efflective date. U.S.
CONsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; see United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 364 (9th Cir. 1975)
(emphasizing that Congress drafted statute so as to avoid conflict with ex post facto clause);
United States v. Field, 432 F. Supp. 55, 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (holding that statute creates sepa-
rate crime comprised of two illegal acts, which is not complete until second act done, and thus
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murder, robbery, extortion, gambling, bribery, arson, kidnapping,
and select federal crimes including obstruction ofjustice, dealing in
obscene material, wire fraud, bank fraud, mail fraud, and securities
fraud.29 According to the statute, two or more such enumerated
crimes, or predicates, can form a pattern of racketeering even if
both are state offenses.30 The basis for federal jurisdiction is a
nexus between the acts of racketeering charged and an "enterprise"
that affects interstate or foreign commerce.31
The use of civil RICO has increased dramatically since 198132 as
plaintiffs extended its application to diverse situations not routinely
described as organized crime.33 Because the definition of pattern
can affect the statute's scope, not surprisingly, it is the most contro-
versial and litigated issue in RICO jurisprudence today.
34
The first Supreme Court effort to interpret the pattern require-
ment was in 1985, in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.35 The Sedima Court
suggested that a "pattern of racketeering activity" is established if
satisfies expost facto clause requirement of necessary notice), aff'd, 578 F.2d 1371 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 801 (1978).
29. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A)-(E) (1988).
30. Id. § 1961(1), (5).
31. Id. § 1962; see supra note 27 (listing provisions requiring nexus).
32. See Recent Developments, Civil RICO and the Prior Criminal Conviction Requirement: Has
the Second Circuit Drawn the Net Too Tightly, 60 WASH. L. REv. 461,461 (1985) (noting escalation
of private civil RICO cases in recent years); Mansnerus, supra note 12, at 1, col. 1 (reporting
that 19 civil RICO suits were filed in federal courts in 1981, 117 in 1984, 1,095 in year ending
June 30, 1987, and 959 in year endingJune 30, 1988).
33. See Williams v. Hall, 683 F. Supp. 639, 642 (E.D. Ky. 1988) (allowing two wrongfully
discharged employees to recover $6 million treble damage award because their termination
was in furtherance of conspiracy); Marconi v. White Sox, Ltd., No. 83-C-7015 (N.D. Ill. Mar.
31, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (memorandum opinion and order) (dismissing
complaint brought against security guards who, on two occasions, attempted to confiscate
baseball game tickets from scalpers trying to sell tickets near Comiskey Park); Congregation
Beth Yitzhok v. Briskman, 566 F. Supp. 555, 557 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (attempting to apply RICO
to power dispute between rival religious factions); Prudential Ins. Co. v. United States Gyp-
sum Co., No. 4227 (D.NJ. Mar. 28, 1989) (holding former manufacturers and distributors of
asbestos building materials may be sued under RICO for alleged decades-long conspiracy to
conceal asbestos danger fraudulently); Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonage, 889
F.2d 466, 477 (3d Cir. 1989) (upholding district court assessment of roughly $100,000 in
damages and attorneys' fees against 27 members of pro-life group who unlawfully entered
health clinics, damaged property, and harassed staff and patients), rev'd sub nom. Walton v.
Northeast Women's Center, 110 S. Ct. 1788 (1990). But see McMonagle v. Northeast Wo-
men's Center, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 261, 261 (1989) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)
(arguing Court should review decision because Third Circuit imposed RICO liability where
neither "enterprise" nor pattern of racketeering had profit-making motive).
34. D. SMrrH & T. REED, supra note 15, at 4-1. Some of the controversy surrounding the
word pattern may be due to the fact that it is used a number of times throughout the RICO
statute in different contexts. See Supporters of RICO Bill Deny Opposition Charges of "Special Inter-
est" Legislation, 5 Civil RICO Rep. (BNA) No. 4, at 1 (June 20, 1989) [hereinafter Supporters of
RICO] (noting use of RICO against organizations engaged in first amendment activity is par-
ticularly controversial because RICO's loose definition of "pattern of racketeering activity"
may entangle innocent individuals in RICO suits and, thus, stifle free expression).
35. 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
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the predicate acts are continuous and related, but did not explain
what it meant by continuity or relationship.3 6 The Court acknowl-
edged that RICO's broad language resulted in unanticipated appli-
cations of the statute but explained that Congress has the
responsibility to correct this defect if it desires to do so. 37
Sedima generated extensive commentary on the scope of RICO in
civil suits. 38 Courts that wished to limit civil RICO embraced
Sedima's "continuity" language.3 9 By requiring continuity as part of
the pattern or "enterprise" element, judges could dismiss cases for
failure to plead continuity, thus significantly restricting the scope of
RICO.40 Before Sedima, there was no judicial requirement that the
predicate acts pose a threat of continued racketeering activity.41
36. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 n.14 (1985).
37. Id. at 499. The Supreme Court's decision in Sedima does not resemble Congress'
intentions regarding the pattern requirement in that no meaningful continuity or relationship
requirement was discussed in the original RICO bill. S. 1861, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 1961
(1969). The bill that eventually became RICO defined "pattern of racketeering activity" as
including at least one act that had occurred after the effective date of the chapter. Id.
§ 1961 (1)(A). After the Department ofJustice concluded that "pattern of racketeering activ-
ity" meant at least two acts, Congress amended the definition to provide that a pattern in-
cluded at least two acts, with the caveat that one of the acts occur after the effective date of the
chapter. Id. § 1961(6). Concern that the definition lacked a temporal restriction resulted in
the addition of a requirement that each predicate act occur within 10 years, excluding impris-
onment, after the commission of a prior act of "racketeering activity." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5)
(1988); see United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778, 782 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (interpreting 10-
year limitation). In its present form, pattern is not defined but "requires" that at least two
acts of "racketeering activity" be committed within a 10-year period. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5)
(1988). Whether the 10-year limitation could be read as requiring that there be a nexus be-
tween the two predicate acts was uncertain. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. at 782 (arguing 10-year
limitation in statute provides nexus between two predicate acts). The definition, however,
does not explicitly require that the predicate acts be related or continuous. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961(5) (1988). Moreover, because the legislative history reveals that Congress spent a
significant amount of time in choosing the definition of pattern, yet failed to require a causal
nexus, some courts held that the only relationship requirement that can be imposed is that the
two predicate acts occur within 10 years of each other. See DePalma, 461 F. Supp. at 782
(holding that definition of pattern contains no mention of relatedness).
Finally, it is interesting to note that in United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981), the
Supreme Court simply stated that there is no limitation on the type of association embraced
by RICO's pattern element. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 580. This broad interpretation of pattern
suggests that the Court was not then concerned with limiting RICO's scope by requiring a
form of continuity. D. REED & T. SMrrH, supra note 15, at 4-12.
38. See generally Huestis, RICO: The Meaning of "Pattern" Since Sedima, 54 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 621 (1988) (concluding Sedima decision indicates that it is not possible for courts to
develop uniform definitions of relationship and continuity and that standards should change
to accommodate varied fact patterns); Goldsmith, RICO and "Pattern:"[sic] The Search for "Con-
tinuity and Relationship'" 73 CORNELL L. REv. 971 (1988) (examining Sedima's aftermath); Com-
ment, The Pattern Element of RICO Before and After Sedima: A Look at Both Federal and Florida
RICO, 15 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 321 (1987) (analyzing pattern element before and after Sedima);
Note, The Pattern Requirement in Civil RICO Is Working: Case Law After Sedima, 33 VILL. L. REv.
205 (1988) (chronicling appellate courts' interpretation of pattern after Sedima).
39. See U.S. DEP'T oFJUsT. RICO MANUAL, supra note 7, at 54 (emphasizing "continuity"
language not necessary to Sedima Court's decision).
40. D. SMrrH & T. REED, supra note 15, at 4-5 to 4-6.
41. Id. at 4-2. A few cases decided before Sedima did recognize or suggest that the term
pattern implied a requirement of continuity. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 745 F.2d 733,
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The Supreme Court elaborated upon this concept in H.J. Inc. v.
Northwestern Bell Telephone Co. ,42 wherein the Court articulated a two-
pronged continuity test.
43
B. Pre-H.J. Inc. Circuit Court Pattern Tests
The definitions of pattern adopted by the circuit courts that ad-
dressed it can be categorized loosely into five approaches. 44 These
pre-H.J. Inc. approaches may be identified as follows: 1) the multiple
schemes test, 2) the Blockburger test, 3) the totality of the circum-
stances test, 4) the Blockburger enhanced test, and 5) the Sedima con-
tinuity plus relationship test.4
5
The Eighth Circuit adopted the multiple schemes test. Following
the Supreme Court's decision in Sedima, the Eighth Circuit consist-
ently held that a single scheme involving the commission of numer-
ous related acts, over a substantial period of time, is not sufficient
for a pattern and that a RICO pattern requires that the multiple acts
be in furtherance of multiple schemes.46 The Eighth Circuit failed
751 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding continuing criminal enterprise statute violations must be substan-
tially distinct to serve as predicates); United States v. Computer Science Corp., 689 F.2d 118 1,
1189 (4th Cir. 1982) (holding Congress did not intend single ongoing illegal act to meet
pattern requirement); United States v. Moeller, 402 F. Supp. 49, 57 (D. Conn. 1975) (con-
tending pattern implies that different crimes are sufficiently related and demonstrate
continuity).
42. 109 S. Ct. 2893 (1989).
43. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 109 S. Ct. 2893, 2900 (1989).
44. The Special Counsel to the Chief, Organized Crime and Racketeering Section, Crim-
inal Division, United States Department ofJustice developed the categorization and descrip-
tion of the tests. Interview with Frankj. Marine, Special Counsel to the Chief, in Washington,
D.C. (Nov. 3, 1989) [hereinafter Interview].
45. A sixth approach, the multiple episodes test, has not been squarely adopted by a
court of appeals, but the Department ofJustice uses this test as its general internal guideline
in reviewing proposed RICO actions. See U.S. DEP'T OFJUST. RICO MANUAL, supra note 7, at
57-58.
The multiple episodes test requires proof of multiple episodes, de-emphasizes the con-
tinuity concept, and suffers from the same statutory construction problems as the multiple
schemes test; it is not supported by RICO's definition of pattern or "racketeering activity,"
and is contrary to the explicit use of acts as the measuring units. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1988).
DOJ terms the multiple episodes test "the single episode rule." U.S. DEP'T OFJUST. RICO
MANUAL, supra at 52. Using this rule, two or more predicate acts that stem from a single
episode may not constitute multiple racketeering acts. Id. at 57-58. Moreover, the RICO
manual notes that the offenses of narcotics importation and possession with intent to dis-
tribute would be considered a single episode. Id. at 58. Finally, it is worthy to note that the
Seventh Circuit defined episode to be more than a single predicate act but less than a scheme.
Lipin Enter., Inc. v. Lee, 803 F.2d 322, 324 (7th Cir. 1986).
46. See Phoenix Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, F.A. v. Shearson Loeb Rhoades, Inc., 856 F.2d
1125, 1128 (8th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal of RICO claim involving single scheme), cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 1340 (1989); Terre Du Lac Ass'n, Inc. v. Terre Du Lac, Inc., 834 F.2d 148,
149-50 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding that acts of mail fraud constituted single scheme and did not
meet multiple schemes requirement for establishing pattern, but vacated in light of H.J. Inc.),
vacated, 57 U.S.L.W. 3853 (1989); United States v. Kragness, 830 F.2d 842, 858-59 (8th Cir.
1987) (establishing that several ventures to import and traffic drugs satisfied RICO's multiple
scheme requirement and stating that each defendant need not personally participate in two
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to recognize that neither the plain terms of the RICO statute nor the
Sedima decision 47 require multiple schemes; the word scheme is no-
where mentioned in the statute.48 Rather, the RICO statute pro-
vides that a " 'pattern of racketeering activity' requires at least two
acts of racketeering activity."
'49
The Eleventh Circuit applied the Blockburger double jeopardy test
to RICO. 50 In pre-Sedima cases, the Fifth and Seventh Circuits also
followed this approach.5 1 The Blockburger test is based on the princi-
ple that multiple offenses arising out of the same transaction may be
different schemes); Madden v. Gluck, 815 F.2d 1163, 1164 n.1 (8th Cir.) (disagreeing with
United States v. Ianniello, 808 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1986), and stating that pattern requires
multiple schemes), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1006 (1987); Deviries v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc.,
805 F.2d 326, 329 (8th Cir. 1986) (stating that numerous fraudulent securities sales over six-
year period, pursuant to single plan to produce excessive sales commissions, did not consti-
tute pattern); Holmberg v. Morrisette, 800 F.2d 205, 209-10 (8th Cir. 1936) (holding that
multiple acts of mail and wire fraud, relating to single scheme to defraud, do not constitute
pattern), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1028 (1987); Superior Oil Co. v. Fulmer, 785 F.2d 252, 254-58
(8th Cir. 1986) (holding that pattern requires proof of "continuity plus relationship" and that
several related acts of mail and wire fraud pursuant to single scheme to defraud did not con-
stitute pattern).
47. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1985) (alleging only single
fraudulent scheme whose sufficiency for pleading was not questioned).
48. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988).
49. Id. § 1961(5) (1988) (emphasis added).
50. See United States v. Alexander, 850 F.2d 1500, 1506 (11th Cir. 1988) (finding that
violation of Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1988), and conspiracy to violate Hobbs Act consti-
tuted two predicate acts and thus "pattern of racketeering activity"), vacated, 109 S. Ct. 3236
(1989) (vacating and remanding in light of H.J. Inc.); United States v. Hobson, 825 F.2d 364,
366 n.2 (11th Cir. 1987) (stating that two separate crimes are two separate acts for RICO
purposes), vacated, 109 S. Ct. 3233 (1989) (vacating and remanding in light of H.J. Inc.);
United States v. Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487, 1502 n.20 (I th Cir. 1986) (establishing that 17
separate payments pursuant to one scheme constituted seventeen separate violations of 18
U.S.C. § 1954 (1988), and, therefore, seventeen predicate acts), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 917
(1987); United States v. Fernandez, 797 F.2d 943, 951 & n.5 (11th Cir. 1986) (determining
that conspiracies to kidnap and murder same victim were separate predicate acts and fulfilled
pattern requirement), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1006 (1987); United States v. Watchmaker, 761
F.2d 1459, 1475 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that shooting three persons during single episode
constitutes three separate predicate acts because each shooting was separate violation of stat-
ute as matter of law), cert. denied sub nom. Harrell v. United States, 474 U.S. 1100 (1986);
United States v. Pepe, 747 F.2d 632, 661-63 (1 1th Cir. 1984) (holding that use ofextortion to
receive extension of credit, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 894 (1988), constituted separate act
from interstate travel to carry out that act, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1988), and thus
formed pattern); United States v. Bascaro, 742 F.2d 1335, 1361 (11 th Cir. 1984) (holding that
possessing and importing marijuana constitute two separate crimes and are therefore two
separate acts necessary for pattern), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1017 (1985); United States v. Gottes-
man, 724 F.2d 1517, 1521-22 (11th Cir. 1984) (determining that two "government-induced"
pornography sales constituted pattern).
51. See United States v. Colacurcio, 659 F.2d 684, 688 n.4 (5th Cir. 1981) (determining
each act of bribery pursuant to single scheme to be separate act), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1002
(1982); United States v. Martino, 648 F.2d 367, 402-03 (5th Cir. 1981) (determining that
arson and mail fraud arising from same fire are separate acts), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 949 (1982);
United States v. Morris, 532 F.2d 436, 442 (5th Cir. 1976) (holding defendants' participation
in several card games over 19 month period sufficient for pattern); United States v. Starnes,
644 F.2d 673, 677-78 (7th Cir.) (holding that arson and interstate travel to commit arson are
separate acts and, therefore, form requisite pattern), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 826 (1981); United
States v. Weatherspoon, 581 F.2d 595, 601-02 (7th Cir. 1978) (holding that five mailings
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considered separate and distinct violations of different statutes.
52
Two offenses arising from the same criminal transaction are consid-
ered to be separate racketeering acts if each offense requires proof
of an element that the other does not.53 When a single statute is
involved, courts following the Blockburger test rely on the law gov-
erning the statute to determine whether multiple offenses may be
charged.54 The Blockburger test does not include any relationship or
continuity requirement.
The Third and Ninth Circuits used the totality of circumstances
test to determine whether the pattern requirement was fulfilled.
Under this multi-factor test, the number of unlawful acts, victims,
and perpetrators are considered, as well as the character and simi-
larity of the unlawful acts and the length of time over which they
were committed. 55 The totality of circumstances test is highly fact-
pursuant to one scheme to defraud constituted five racketeering acts of mail fraud that formed
requisite pattern).
52. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 302-04 (1932).
53. See id. at 304.
54. See supra notes 50-51 (listing cases applying Blockburger test to RICO).
55. See United States v. Zauber, 857 F.2d 137, 148-49 (3d Cir. 1988) (finding pattern
that satisfied Barticheck v. Fidelity Union Bank/First Nat'l State, 832 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1987)
criteria even though multiple kickback payments were alleged as only one predicate), cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 1340 (1989); United States v. Echeverri, 854 F.2d 638, 649 (3d Cir. 1988)
(finding possession of narcotics with intent to distribute, conspiracy among many participants,
large volumes of drugs, and large number of potential victims fulfilled pattern requirement);
Environmental Tectonics v. W.S. Kirkpatrick, Inc., 847 F.2d 1052, 1063 (3d Cir. 1988) (hold-
ing that RICO pattern does not require multiple schemes or open-ended scheme); Paradise
Hotel Corp. v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 842 F.2d 47, 53 (3d Cir. 1988) (noting bank's allegedly
unlawful involuntary bankruptcy petition filing against plaintiff was insufficient to fulfill pat-
tern requirements under Marshall-Silver Constr. Co. v. Mendel, 835 F.2d 63 (3d Cir. 1987));
Saporito v. Combustion Eng'g Inc., 843 F.2d 666, 676-78 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that multi-
ple schemes are not required for pattern and that numerous indictments of various employ-
ees, over extended time period, would constitute pattern), vacated, 109 S. Ct. 1306 (1989);
Marshall-Silver Constr. Co. v. Mendel, 835 F.2d 63, 66-67 (3d Cir. 1987) (rejecting Eighth
Circuit's multiple schemes test and adopting multi-factor "case-by-case analysis" of factors
listed in Barticheck v. Fidelity Union Bank/First Nat'l State, 832 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1987)),
vacated, 57 U.S.L.W. 3853 (1989) (vacating in light of H.J. Inc.); Barticheck v. Fidelity Union
Bank/First Nat'l State, 832 F.2d 36, 39 (3d Cir. 1987) (rejecting multiple schemes test and
holding pattern is determined by considering various factors including "the number of unlaw-
ful acts, the length of time over which the acts were committed, the similarity of the acts, the
number of victims, the number of perpetrators, and the character of the unlawful activity");
Town of Kearny v. Hudson Meadows Urban Renewal Corp., 829 F.2d 1263, 1266-68 (3d Cir.
1987) (declining to require multiple schemes, but holding that several bribes in two transac-
tions established pattern); Petro-Tech, Inc. v. W. Co., 824 F.2d 1349, 1353-56 (3d Cir. 1987)
(declining to specify particular test for determining pattern in civil RICO case, but holding
that allegations met all various tests advanced); United States v. Grayson, 795 F.2d 278, 288-
90 (3d Cir. 1986) (declining to decide what pattern required, but holding that multiple acts of
manufacturing, possessing, and distributing narcotics constituted pattern), cert. denied, 481
U.S. 1018 (1987); Malley-Duff & Assoc., Inc. v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 792 F.2d 341, 353 n.20
(3d Cir. 1986) (observing that Sedima gave little guidance on pattern definition, and holding
that allegation of similar conduct, in different cities, was sufficient to satisfy even most strin-
gent post-Sedina pattern test), aff'd, 483 U.S. 143 (1987); United States v. Boffa, 688 F.2d 919,
934 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding that four separate payments for monthly automobile use consti-
tuted four separate violations of Taft-Hartley, 29 U.S.C. § 186(a) (1988), and four predicate
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specific and is criticized because it rejects the "enterprise" as an ad-
ditional source of continuity, results in repetition of factors,5 6 and
lacks predictability.
57
The Second Circuit used a modified form of the Blockburger test,
referred to here as the Blockburger "enhanced" test. 58 This test
added to Blockburger the more specific requirements of "relationship
and continuity." Only the Second Circuit, for example, held explic-
itly that the "continuity and relationship" requirement is fulfilled
when the two predicate acts are related to the "enterprise" and
either the predicate acts or the "enterprise" poses a threat of con-
tinuity. 59 The Second Circuit defines a unit of "racketeering activ-
acts), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1022 (1983); see also Blake v. Dierdorff, 866 F.2d 1365, 1368 (9th
Cir. 1988) (reversing district court's dismissal of claim regarding fraud in securities purchase,
noting that multiple schemes requirement had been rejected); United States v. Kirk, 844 F.2d
660, 663-64 (9th Cir.) (establishing that RICO pattern does not require multiple schemes),
cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 222 (1988); United Energy Owners Comm., Inc. v. United States Energy
Management Sys., Inc., 837 F. 2d 356, 360 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that Ninth Circuit does not
require multiple schemes for pattern; all that is necessary are predicate acts that are not iso-
lated or sporadic and pose continuous threat); Medallion Television Enter., Inc. v. SelecTV
of California, Inc., 833 F.2d 1360, 1362-65 (9th Cir. 1987) (declining to adopt Sedima's con-
tinuity plus relationship test, multiple schemes test, or multiple episodes test), cert. denied, 109
S. Ct. 3241 (1989); Jarvis v. Regan, 833 F.2d 149, 153 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that isolated
acts of mail and wire fraud did not represent sufficient threat of continuity to constitute pat-
tern), cert. denied sub nom. Shabazz v. Thurman, 108 S. Ct. 2851 (1988); Sun Say. & Loan Ass'n
v. Dierdorff, 825 F.2d 187, 193-94 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that series of acts, from one
scheme, can be pattern if they are continuous, but that continuity requires "threat of continu-
ing activity" at some point during racketeering activity); California Architectural Bldg. Prod.
Inc. v. Franciscan Ceramics, Inc., 818 F.2d 1466, 1469 (9th Cir. 1987) (rejecting separate
episode requirement in civil RICO case and holding that multiple fraudulent sales to multiple
victims constitutes pattern), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 108 (1988); Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-
Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1398-99 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that defendant's actions
in two or more uses of mail or telephone to achieve fraudulent diversion of single shipment of
products was isolated event that did not establish requisite threat of continuing activity).
56. Interview, supra note 44 (suspecting that multitude of factors to be considered leads
courts to require some degree of repetition regarding schemes, ventures, victims, etc.).
57. Goldsmith, RICO and "'Pattern:" [sic] The Search for "Continuity Plus Relationship", 73
CORNELL L. REV. 971, 982 (1988) (noting that totality test often achieved unpredictable and
inappropriate results).
58. See United States v. Indelicato, 865 F.2d 1370, 1382-84 (2d Cir.) (holding that pat-
tern must have relationship and threat of continuity, which can be shown by external factors),
cert. denied sub nom. Furnari v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 3192 (1989); Beauford v. Helmsley, 843
F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1988), reh'gen banc, 865 F.2d 1386, 1391 (2d Cir. 1989) (stating that com-
plaint is required to allege acts of racketeering that are neither isolated nor sporadic), vacated,
109 S. Ct. 3236 (1989) (vacating in light of H.J. Inc.); Albany Ins. Co. v. Esses, 831 F.2d 41,
43-45 (2d Cir. 1987) (finding that "enterprise" had definite termination date and therefore
did not pose threat of continuity); Beck v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 820 F.2d 46, 51
(2d Cir. 1987) (rejecting multiple episode test and holding that two related acts of mail and
fraud satisfied pattern requirement), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1005 (1988); United States v. Ian-
niello, 808 F.2d 184, 189-91 (2d Cir. 1986) (rejecting multiple scheme requirement and hold-
ing that at least two related acts in furtherance of continuing criminal "enterprise" satisfies
pattern requirement), cert. dnied, 483 U.S. 1006 (1987).
59. See United States v. Benevento, 836 F.2d 60, 72 (2d Cir. 1987) (reiterating rejection
of multiple schemes requirement, and stating that "[s]o long as the defendants commit at
least two predicate acts, they have met the pattern requirement and, so long as the enterprise
is long and elaborate enough to be considered continuing, the enterprise requirement is satis-
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ity" as an act that violates the state or federal statutes explicitly
enumerated in RICO section 1961(1).6o The Second Circuit's ap-
proach does not read a requirement of multiple schemes or epi-
sodes into the statute.61 Furthermore, this approach addresses the
need for "relationship and continuity" without getting tangled in a
myriad of factors that could lead to a requirement of multiple
schemes or episodes.
62
The Sedima test was applied by the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and
Tenth Circuits, 63 which held that a "pattern of racketeering activity"
must reflect "continuity plus relationship" such that "proof of two
acts of racketeering, without more, does not establish a pattern."
6
The formulation and basic approach of this test are similar to those
of the totality of circumstance test 65 and to the Second Circuit's
Blockburger "enhanced" test.6 6 Moreover, except for explicitly
enumerating the list of factors to be considered under the totality of
circumstances test, the Sedima test is essentially the same as the total-
ity of circumstances test.
67
An analysis of the diverse methods that have been employed by
fled"), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2035 (1988); see also United States v. Teitler, 802 F.2d 606, 611-
12 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that two acts of mail fraud involving submission of false claims to
two insurance companies by "enterprise" law firm constituted pattern).
60. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1988) (listing statutory violations that are included in defini-
tion of "racketeering activity"); see also supra note 58 (illustrating Second Circuit's approach to
defining pattern).
61. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (listing Second Circuit cases that reject mul-
tiple schemes requirement).
62. See Brief for Amicus Curiae United States in Support of Petitioner at 5-20, H.J. Inc. v.
Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 109 S. Ct. 2893 (1989) (No. 87-1252) (urging Court to adopt this
approach) [hereinafter Brief for United States].
63. See, e.g., LaVay Corp. v. Dominion Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 830 F.2d 522, 529 (4th
Cir. 1987) (finding that single breach of fiduciary duty did not constitute pattern), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 1065 (1988); HMK Corp. v. Walsey, 828 F.2d 1071, 1073-77 (4th Cir. 1987) (refus-
ing to adopt all-encompassing definition of pattern but holding that "existence of a pattern
thus depends on context, particularly on the nature of the underlying offenses"), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 1009 (1988); Montesano v. Seafirst Commercial Corp., 818 F.2d 423, 425-26 (5th
Cir. 1987) (relying on Sedima dictum and holding that preparatory acts pursuant to single
objective did not establish pattern); Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 804 F.2d 970, 973-76 (7th
Cir. 1986) (rejecting multiple episodes or schemes requirement in civil RICO case, holding
that racketeering acts must be separate and continue, over time, to form pattern); Pitts v.
Turner & Boisseau, Chartered, 850 F.2d 650, 652 (10th Cir. 1988) (noting that plaintiff only
alleged one scheme, even though many acts may have occurred, and one scheme was insuffi-
cient to establish pattern with requisite continuity), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 838 (1989); Torwest
DBC, Inc. v. Dick, 810 F.2d 925, 927-29 (10th Cir. 1987) (holding that, under Sedima, requi-
site continuity of unlawful activity was lacking when fraudulent activity continued over time
but was not alleged to continue after single goal accomplished).
64. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 n.14 (1985).
65. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text (examining factors totality of circum-
stances test considers in discerning pattern).
66. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text (examining Second Circuit's Blockburger
"enhanced" test).
67. Compare supra notes 55-57 (examining totality of circumstances test) with supra notes
63-64 (discussing Sedima continuity plus relationship test).
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the circuit courts to determine whether a RICO pattern exists sug-
gests that no standard is entirely satisfactory. The factors that sat-
isfy the RICO pattern requirement are almost exclusively ofjudicial
construct and are primarily designed to circumscribe the use of
RICO.68 Because the RICO statute does not explain how the predi-
cate acts must be connected in order to form a pattern, there is no
principled basis for choosing one test over another.69 Critics claim
that the application of different tests results in unequal treatment of
RICO litigants. 70 Faced with varying interpretations of the meaning
of "pattern of racketeering activity," the Supreme Court, in H.J. Inc.
v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co. ,71 sought to define meaningfully the
pattern requirement.
II. H.J. INC. v. NORTHWESTERN BELL TELEPHONE Co.
A. Factual and Procedural History
In H.J. Inc., the plaintiffs, a Minnesota corporation and Minnesota
residents, purchased telecommunication goods and services from
Northwestern Bell. 72 They brought a class action suit alleging that
Northwestern Bell, through its corporate agents, violated RICO by
seeking to influence illegally members of the Minnesota Public Utili-
ties Commission (MPUC), the regulatory body that sets rates for the
services Northwestern Bell provides. 73 The plaintiffs alleged that
Northwestern Bell bribed certain MPUC members between 1980
and 1986 with intent to influence the commissioners to approve un-
fair and unreasonable rates.74 The plaintiffs further alleged that
Northwestern Bell's acts of bribery constituted a "pattern of racke-
teering activity" that was used to operate the telephone company as
a RICO "enterprise." 75 They sought treble damages and an injunc-
tion forbidding defendants from engaging in further unlawful
68. D. SMrrH & T. REED, supra note 15, at 4-6.
69. Compare supra note 28 and accompanying text (reciting language of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961(5) (1988) containing only temporal relationship requirement) with supra notes 44-67
and accompanying text (tracing development of diverse factors circuit courts used to satisfy
RICO's pattern requirement).
70. See Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Certiori at 8, HJ. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel.
Co., 109 S. Ct. 2893 (1989) (No. 87-1252) (arguing that certiorari be granted to resolve conflict
in courts that led to unequal treatment of RICO plaintiffs).
71. 109 S. Ct. 2893 (1989).
72. HJ. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 648 F. Supp. 419 (D. Minn. 1986), aft'd, 829
F.2d 648 (8th Cir. 1987), rev'd and remanded, 109 S. Ct. 2893, 2897 (1989).
73. Id. at 2897-98.
74. Id. at 2897.
75. Id. The first count in plaintiffs' complaint alleged a pendent state claim that North-
western Bell violated the Minnesota bribery statute as well as the state common law bribery
prohibition. Id. Counts two through four of the complaint alleged four separate claims under
section 1962. Id; see supra note 27 (listing § 1962 offenses).
930
1991] RICO "PATrERN"-A PROPOSED DEFINITION
activity. 76
Using the Sedima continuity plus relationship test, the district
court found that the plaintiffs alleged a relationship between the
predicate acts of bribery by pleading that the acts were all designed
to influence illegally MPUC members.77 The district court, how-
ever, held that the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the continuity prong of
the Sedima test because each of the fraudulent acts committed was in
furtherance of a single scheme to influence Commission members.78
Holding that a RICO pattern is fulfilled only by the existence of
multiple illegal schemes, the court thus held that the alleged pay-
ments, spanning six years, fell short of establishing a pattern and
dismissed the civil RICO claim.79
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal, stressing that, in order
to establish a "pattern of racketeering activity," appellees must
prove relationship and continuity. 0 According to the court, multi-
ple illegal acts committed to further a single fraudulent effort or
scheme fails the continuity prong of the test and is insufficient to
show a pattern.8 ' Although two acts are required to establish a
"pattern of racketeering" under the RICO language, the court held
that two acts, without more, are not sufficient to establish a pat-
tern.8 2 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the dispute
in the lower courts about whether a RICO pattern must be estab-
lished by multiple acts of racketeering committed to further multi-
ple illegal schemes or whether multiple acts committed to further a
single fraudulent scheme could suffice.83
B. The Supreme Court's Decision
The United States Supreme Court unanimously reversed the
judgment of the Eighth Circuit and remanded for further proceed-
ings in H.J. Inc.8 4 In attempting to define pattern, the Court, in an
opinion by Justice Brennan, grappled with the ambiguities of the
76. Id.
77. HJ. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 648 F. Supp. 419, 425 (D. Minn. 1986).
78. Id. at 425-26.
79. Id.
80. H.J. Inc., 829 F.2d 648, 650 (8th Cir. 1987).
81. Id.
82. Id. (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 n.14 (1985)).
83. HJ. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 109 S. Ct. 2893, 2898 (1989).
84. Id. at 2906. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Justices
White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens. Id. Justice Scalia filed a concurring opinion in
which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Kennedy joined. Id. Argued on
November 8, 1988, H.J. Inc. was the oldest undecided case on the Court's docket. Broad Use of
RICO is Upheld, N.Y. Times, June 27, 1989, at Al, col. 1.
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statute.85 Brennan admitted that "developing a meaningful concept
of 'pattern' ... proved to be no easy task."'8 6
The Supreme Court began its analysis by examining the text of
the RICO statute.8 7 The Court remarked that the statute does not
provide an exacting definition of "pattern of racketeering activ-
ity." s8 8 Rather, the statute states "a minimum necessary condition
for the existence of such a pattern." 8 9 Upon reviewing the legisla-
tive history of the statute, the Court determined that Congress in-
tended a flexible definition of pattern. 90 The Court concluded that,
in order to prove a "pattern of racketeering activity," a plaintiff or
prosecutor must show not only that at least two racketeering predi-
cate acts are related, but also that they are continuous or that they
threaten continuity.91 The Court repudiated the inflexible "multi-
ple schemes" test, which required that continuity be established by
showing that the predicate acts furthered multiple illegal
schemes. 92 It reasoned that multiple predicate acts committed to
further a single illegal scheme could demonstrate the continuity
necessary for a pattern.93
The Court broadly defined "relationship" as requiring that the
predicate acts be related to one another, or to some "external or-
ganizing principle."'94 According to the Court, the term "con-
tinuity," which is more difficult to define than "relationship," is a





90. Id. at 2899-900.
91. Id. at 2900.
92. Id. at 2901.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 2900. The H.J. Inc. Court looked to the partially repealed Dangerous Special
Offender Act (DSOA) for guidance in defining "relationship." Id. at 2900-01; see 18 U.S.C.
§ 3575(e) (1988) (enacted Oct. 12, 1984 but repealed in part Nov. 1, 1986, pursuant to sec-
tion 235 of Pub. L. No. 98-476) (defining DSOA's pattern requirement in terms of relation-
ship between criminal acts). Because the DSOA was enacted as a companion provision in the
1970 statute that contained RICO, the H.J. Inc. Court maintained that RICO's definition of
the term pattern should be construed consistently with the term as used in DSOA. HJ. Inc.,
109 S. Ct. at 2901. Like RICO, the focus of DSOA was organized crime. Id. at 2902. Unlike
RICO, DSOA contained an elaborate definition of the term pattern: "criminal conduct forms
a pattern if it embraces criminal acts that have the same or similar purposes, results, partici-
pants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing
characteristics and are not isolated events." 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e) (1988). DSOA's definition
of pattern is substantially similar to the totality of circumstances test's definition. See supra
notes 55-57 and accompanying text (describing contours and criticisms of totality of circum-
stances test's definition). DSOA's definition would allow multiple predicates committed in
furtherance of a single common scheme to fulfill the requirements of pattern. See Brief for
United States, supra note 62, at 10 (criticizing Eighth Circuit's interpretation of pattern for
requiring separate schemes).
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temporal concept and can be "dosed-ended" or "open-ended." 95
Closed-ended continuity includes related predicates occurring over
a finite period of time longer than a few weeks or months.96 Open-
ended continuity encompasses predicates bearing a distinct threat
of long-term racketeering activityP 7 Despite the urging of various
amici, the Court refused to define "relationship" and "continuity"
narrowly in order to target organized crime in its traditional sense. 98
Explaining the Court's unwillingness to construe narrowly the
RICO statute's pattern element by requiring proof of an organized
crime nexus, Justice Brennan noted that although RICO may be a
poorly drafted statute, any revision of RICO is a task for the legisla-
ture, and not the Court.99
Justice Scalia, in a scathing concurring opinion, criticized the
Court's interpretative effort. 100 Justice Scalia saw little value in the
Court's attempt to clarify the pattern requirement, calling the "con-
tinuity plus relationship" standard as helpful as the platitude "life is
a fountain."'' He interpreted the Court's dosed-ended continuity
concept, which encompasses predicates that do not pose a threat of
continuity but are committed over a substantial period of time, to
mean that one can engage in a few months of racketeering activity
without fear of RICO liability.' 0 2 He concluded that "something
more" than two mere acts of racketeering is required to form a
RICO pattern, but he could not provide the additional element.'
03
Moreover, Justice Scalia noted that the Court's inability to provide
anything more than "meager guidance" in interpreting the statute
95. H.J. Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2900, 2902.
96. Id. at 2902.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 2902-03; see Brief for Amicus Curiae American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants (AICPA) in Support of Respondents at 21, HJ. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel.
Co., 109 S. Ct. 2893 (1989) (No. 87-1252) (arguing against fulfilling requirements of pattern
with single criminal episode or transaction). AICPA expressed special interest in addressing
the proper construction of pattern because
[w]hen independent auditors express opinion on a client's financial statements, they
become exposed to RICO actions brought by investors, creditors and others who
may claim to have relied upon those statements in making important decisions that
ultimately prove unsatisfactory or in entering into business transactions with the au-
ditor's [sic] clients that do not meet expectations.
Brief for AICPA, supra, at 2; see also Brief for Amicus Curiae National Association of Manufac-
turers in Support of Respondents at 5, Hj. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 109 S. Ct. 2893
(1989) (No. 87-1252) (arguing that pattern requires multiple criminal schemes and that such a
requirement will exclude routine commercial dispute from statute's reach "thereby curbing
the primary abuse of civil RICO.").
99. H.J. Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2905.
100. Id. at 2906-09 (ScaliaJ., concurring).
101. Id. at 2907 (Scalia, J., concurring).
102. Id. at 2908 (Scalia, J., concurring).
103. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
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brings into question the constitutionality of RICO.10 4 Ile predicted
that after H.J. Inc., lower courts would continue to develop irrecon-
cilable tests.' 0 5 He called such ambiguity "intolerable" in a statute
such as RICO, which has criminal as well as civil provisions.' 0 6
III. ANALYSIS
A. Continuity and Relationship Revisited
In H.J. Inc., the Supreme Court built upon the continuity and rela-
tionship standard articulated in Sedima by creating two distinct
methods by which continuity is established.10 7 The two new catego-
ries, closed-ended and open-ended continuity, highlight the dura-
tional nature of continuity.' 08
The first category, closed-ended continuity, refers to a series of
related predicate acts that occur over a substantial period of time.109
Presumably, any series of predicate acts lasting more than a few
weeks or months will constitute closed-ended continuity. 110
The second category, open-ended continuity, is more amorphous
because of the fact-specific nature of "continued racketeering activ-
ity.""' In order to constitute this type of continuity, the related
predicate acts must present a distinct threat of long-term racketeer-
ing activity, either implicit or explicit." 2 The Court posed a hypo-
thetical to illustrate how the open-ended continuity concept would
work in practice." 3 A hoodlum who collects protection money from
a shopkeeper, over a short period of time, but tells the victim that he
will return, engages in a "pattern of racketeering activity" that dem-
onstrates open-ended continuity." 4 The Court reasoned that
although the racketeering acts occurred close together in time, they
carry indefinitely the threat of repetition.' 15
Another guideline the Court provided to discern open-ended
continuity is that the related predicates be "part of an ongoing en-
104. Id. at 2909 (Scalia, J., concurring).
105. Id. at 2908 (Scalia, J., concurring).
106. Id. at 2908-09 (Scalia, J., concurring).
107. The Court built upon the Sedima relationship standard by stating that two acts may be
related to each other or to "some external organizing principle," but did not specify what it
meant by "some external organizing principle." Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479,
496 n.14 (1985); HJ. Inc., 109 S. Ct. 2900.
108. Id. at 2901-02.
109. Id. at 2902.
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tity's regular way of doing business."1 16 This guideline may be
honored in two ways. First, predicates committed by a person "as
part of a long-term association that exists for a criminal purpose"
would suffice."17 The guideline may also be honored by showing
that the predicates are the usual way of conducting an ongoing legit-
imate business or an ongoing and legitimate RICO "enterprise." '" 8
Fact situations that do not constitute closed-ended or open-ended
continuity do not form a "pattern of racketeering activity" and
therefore cannot be sanctioned under RICO." 9 Yet, one commen-
tator predicts that H.J. Inc.'s only substantive impact will be to elimi-
nate from the scope of RICO only a rather narrow category of cases
-those in which the "pattern of racketeering activity" consists of
"several nearly simultaneous predicate acts."' 20 This is because si-
multaneous acts, by definition, do not occur over a substantial pe-
riod of time and are unlikely to pose a threat of continued action. A
literal reading of the Court's decision supports such a prediction.
B. Is RICO's Pattern Requirement Unconstitutionally Vague?
The Supreme Court in H.J. Inc. did not address the constitutional-
ity of RICO's pattern requirement.' 21 In his concurring opinion,
however, Justice Scalia surmised that a constitutional attack on
RICO is imminent and that the Court's opinion in H.J. Inc. contrib-
utes to RICO's vulnerability to such an attack.' 22 The most prob-
able attack on the constitutionality of RICO's "pattern of
racketeering activity" requirement is that it is vague and therefore
violates due process.
23
Before H.J. Inc., federal RICO's pattern element specifically had
116. Id.
117. Id. These associations not only include traditional organized crime groups but other
groups formed for illegitimate purposes as well. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 2908 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia suggested that RICO would not
apply to a gang that commits an act of extortion in a different city every day for one week, and
then completely disbands at the end of the week. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
120. RICO Attorneys Respond to Court's Opinion in H.J. Inc., 5 Civil RICO Rep. (BNA) No. 6,
at 3 (July 4, 1989) (reporting comment of Philip Lacovara, vice president and senior counsel
for General Electric Co. & chairman of coalition for RICO reform).
121. H.J. Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2897; see supra note 83 and accompanying text (discussing issue
raised in H. Inc.); see also Stewart, Scoping Out Statutes, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1989, at 56, col. 3
(noting difficulty that constitutional challenge to RICO could pose forJustices).
122. H.J. Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2909 (Scalia, J., concurring) (lamenting that high Court's in-
ability to provide anything more than "meager guidance," in interpreting RICO, "bodes ill
for the day when ... [constitutional] challenge is presented").
123. CATO Institute Conference on RICO, Rights and the Constitution, Address by G.
Robert Blakey: Is "Pattern" Within RICO Unconstitutionally Vague?-A Comment on Justice
Scalia's Opinion that RICO May Be Void-for-Vagueness 19 (Oct. 18, 1989) (copyrighted man-
uscript) [hereinafter Blakey--CATO Conference] (commenting that Justice Scalia's concur-
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not been subjected to a facial overbreadth or vagueness attack.
124
An Indiana state RICO statute, however, which provided a defini-
tion of "pattern of racketeering activity" analogous to the federal
law, 125 survived such a challenge in Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indi-
ana.126 According to the Court in Fort Wayne Books, the pattern re-
quirement in RICO makes the statute less vague than the state
obscenity law, in which one need not be guilty of a pattern of ob-
ring opinion in HJ. Inc. invites vagueness challenge to RICO's pattern requirement); see U.S.
CONST. amends. V & XIV, § 1.
The principles governing vagueness challenges to statutes are well settled. See generally
Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 509, 519 (1948) (striking down statute on vagueness
grounds based on indefiniteness of conduct covered by statute); United States v. Evans, 333
U.S. 483, 489 (1948) (voiding for vagueness statute that imposed ambiguous sanction);
Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 458 (1939) (holding that vagueness may result from
uncertainty concerning identity of persons covered by statute).
Because a strong presumption of validity attaches to an act of Congress, United States v.
National Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32 (1963), courts consistently seek to uphold statu-
tory interpretations that support the constitutionality of legislation. United States v. Harriss,
347 U.S. 612, 618 (1954). A leading Supreme Court case on vagueness holds that the re-
quirements of the due process clause are fulfilled in the case of overlapping criminal provi-
sions if the statute clearly defines conduct prohibited and the punishment authorized. United
States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123 (1979). The Supreme Court rejected the contention
that a statute challenged on vagueness grounds may be tested solely "on its face." National
Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. at 32. In a vagueness challenge to a statute that does not involve
first amendment guarantees, the facts of the instant case are critical to the outcome. United
States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550 (1975) (citing United States v. National Dairy Prods.
Corp., 372 U.S. 29 (1963)). That Congress could have chosen precise and unambiguous lan-
guage in drafting a statute, yet did not, does not necessarily mean that a statute is unconstitu-
tionally vague. United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 94 (1975). Where first amendment
rights are implicated, however, a defendant may challenge a statute's vagueness "on its face"
and may assert that the statute is vague as applied to marginal situations not before the court.
National Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. at 36.
Statutes with provisions similar to RICO were upheld as valid against void for vagueness
attacks. See generally United States v. Cravero, 545 F.2d 406, 410 (5th Cir.) (rejecting argu-
ment that several terms in 21 U.S.C. § 848 are unconstitutionally vague), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1100 (1976); United States v. McCoy, 539 F.2d 1050, 1058 (5th Cir.) (holding § 1955 not
void for vagueness), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 919 (1976); United States v. Villano, 529 F.2d 1046,
1055 (10th Cir.) (upholding constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 1952 as not void for vagueness
despite ambiguity in terminology of § 1952 because first.amendment guarantees not impli-
cated), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 953 (1976); United States v. Hawes, 529 F.2d 472, 477 (5th Cir.
1976) (rejecting vagueness challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 1955); United States v. Sperling, 506
F.2d 1323, 1343 (2d Cir. 1974) (reaffirming that § 848, which prohibits engaging in continu-
ous criminal enterprise involving narcotics, is not void for vagueness), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
962 (1975); Spinelli v. United States, 382 F.2d 871, 890 (8th Cir. 1967) (stating that § 1952 is
not void for vagueness), rev'd on other grounds, 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
124. Other elements of RICO had been challenged as unconstitutionally vague. See, e.g.,
United States v. Tripp, 782 F.2d 38,41-42 (6th Cir.) (finding no reason to depart from prece-
dent and rejecting argument that RICO's adoption of state law in defining "racketeering ac-
tivity" violates due process), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1228 (1986); United States v. Swiderski, 593
F.2d 1246, 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (noting that RICO conspiracy is not unconstitutionally
vague and that shifts in definition of "enterprise" are validated as necessary in light of fluid
nature of criminal associations), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 993 (1979); United States v. Hawes, 529
F.2d 472, 479 (5th Cir. 1976) (holding definition of "enterprise" is not unconstitutionally
vague despite its breadth).
125. See IND. CODE ANN., infra note 207 (setting forth Indiana RICO statute's pattern
requirement).
126. 109 S. Ct. 916, 923 n.5 (1989).
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scenity violations. 127 The Court held that if the underlying predi-
cate obscenity offenses are not unconstitutionally vague, then RICO
cannot be vague.128 Thus, the holding in Fort Wayne Books implies
that to challenge successfully the pattern element as unconstitution-
ally vague, the underlying predicate offenses on which the determi-
nation of a pattern is based first must be deemed unconstitutionally
vague.' 29 Regardless of whether a court chooses to honor the Fort
Wayne Books approach, the constitutionality of RICO's pattern ele-
ments will be litigated frequently and it is likely that a court will find
grounds to find the definition of pattern unconstitutionally vague.
C. Significant Consequences of HJ. Inc.
Although consumer groups praised the Supreme Court's decision
in H.J. Inc., the business community charged that the Court con-
strued RICO too broadly, to the great detriment of American busi-
ness. 130 Sentiment that RICO use against legitimate businesses
would increase and that traditional business fraud cases would be
brought as civil RICO suits was widespread.13 1 Moreover, it was
suggested that the Court's decision would not end the intensifying
127. Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 109 S. Ct. 916, 925 n.7 (1989).
128. Id. at 924-25.
129. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1988) (listing state and federal crimes that serve as predicates);
see Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 34 (1973) (rejecting dissent's argument that obscenity
statute is unconstitutionally vague). For a comprehensive discussion on RICO's susceptibility
to vagueness challenge see Note, RICO "Pattern" Requirement: Void for Vagueness?, 90 COLUM. L.
REV. 489 (1990) (concluding RICO's pattern requirement is not unconstitutionally vague).
But see Rakoff, The Unconstitutionality of RICO, N.Y.LJ., Jan. 11, 1990, at 3, col. 1 (concluding
RICO's unconstitutionality is warranted).
130. See Broad Use of RICO is Upheld- Unanimous Ruling By Supreme Court in Phone-Rate Case,
N.Y. Times,June 27, 1989, at Al, col. I (stressing that Court's decision rejects interpretation
of RICO as requiring connection to organized crime); Court Refuses to Cap Punitive Damages,
Chicago Trib.,June 27, 1989, at Al, col. 3 (enumerating possible post-H.J. Inc. applications of
RICO); High Awards for Injuries are Upheld, Boston Globe, June 27, 1989, at 70, col. 2 (empha-
sizing breadth of Court's unanimous ruling); High Court Refuses to Curb RICO Scope, Doesn't Limit
Civil Suit Punitive Damages:Justices Vote 9-0 on Issue; 4 Say Ruling Increases Vagueness of 1970 Law,
Wall St. J., June 27, 1989, at A3, col. 1 (quoting authority stating Court's decision is victory
for consumer groups and predicts increased number of RICO suits); Supreme Court Backs Use of
RICO Statute Damages: Application of Antiracketeering to Business is Made Easier, Wash. Post, June
27, 1989, at Cl, col. 3 (quoting authority asserting that thieves in "Brooks Brothers suits"
have reason to fear Court's decision); Supreme Court Deals a Double Blow to Business: Justices Reject
Limits on Punitive Damage Awards, Use of Racketeering Law, L.A. Times, June 27, 1989, at CC1,
col. 4 (stating that "Big Business" was disappointed that Supreme Court did not curtail RICO
use against legitimate business); Top Court Deals Blow to Business: Punitive and RICO Penalties
Sustained,June 27, 1989, Phil. Inquirer,June 27, 1989, at D-1, col. 1 (noting setback to Ameri-
can business from Court's refusal to limit application of RICO to traditional organized crime
groups only).
131. High Court Reects Limits on Personal-Injury Awards, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, June 27,
1989, at IB, col. 1 (stating that Court's decision made use of RICO more feasible for prosecu-
tors to proceed against businesses charged with fraud); Dennison, Supreme Court Upholds Multi-
million-dollar Punitive Damages, June 27, 1989, Balt. Sun, at 2E, col. 6 (stating H.J. Inc. is not
likely to end intensifying controversy over use of RICO in business fraud cases).
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controversy about using RICO to obtain treble damages for busi-
ness fraud. 13 2 Because the H.J. Inc. Court failed to require a nexus
between organized crime and the pattern concept, illegal business
conduct of legally recognized firms continues to fall under the newly
constructed definition of pattern., 33
An analysis of thirty circuit and district court civil RICO cases de-
cided between June 27, 1989 and January 24, 1990, reveals that fif-
teen of them resulted in dismissal on the ground that no pattern
could be shown.13 4 At this time, it is difficult to determine whether
132. Dennison, supra note 131, at IA, col. 6.
133. See supra note 99 and accompanying text (noting Court's rejection of organized crime
nexus); Stewart, Scoping Out Statutes, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1989, at 54, col. 3 (criticizing H.J. Inc.
Court's generous interpretation of RICO that will allow present uses of statute to continue).
But see Blakey-CATO Conference, supra note 123, at 34 (commenting that "[n]o person seek-
ing to keep his conduct within the law need fear RICO. All he must do is not violate the
predicate offense.").
134. See Fleet Credit Corp. v. Sion, 893 F.2d 441 (1st Cir. 1990) (reversing dismissal be-
cause 95 acts of mail fraud over four and one-half-year period sufficient for pattern); United
States v. Gelb, 881 F.2d 1155 (2d Cir. 1989) (relying on H.J. Inc., finding predicate acts of
meter tampering, mailing, and bribing related to cheating postal service and continued for
five years constituted pattern); United States v. Kaplan, 886 F.2d 536 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding
two acts of bribery stemming from one conversation may be separately counted and suffice for
RICO pattern); Jacobsen v. Cooper, 882 F.2d 717 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting that predicates re-
lated to depriving plaintiff of his interest in real estate "enterprise" and extending over many
years fulfilled pattern requirement); Swistock v. E.L. Jones, 884 F.2d 755 (3d Cir. 1989) (re-
versing district court's dismissal on pattern grounds in suit alleging six acts of mail fraud and
eight acts of wire fraud pursuant to lease negotiations); Combs v. Bakker, 886 F.2d 673 (4th
Cir. 1989) (finding multiple acts of mail and wire fraud to sell "lifetime partnerships" in Heri-
tage Village Missionary, Inc., established pattern); United States v. Cooper, 880 F.2d 415 (6th
Cir. 1989) (rejecting defendant's challenge of RICO count on grounds that evidence was in-
sufficient to prove pattern or "enterprise" because evidence revealed defendants continued
generic drug distribution scheme for nearly five years after being warned it was wrong); New-
meyer v. Philatelic Leasing Ltd., 888 F.2d 385 (6th Cir. 1989) (reversing dismissal on pattern
grounds); Cemar Inc. v. Nissan Motor Corp., No. 87-165 (D. Del., Jan. 8, 1990) (ruling that
four false statements in nine years to obtain car dealership agreements meet H.. Inc. con-
tinuity and relationship standards for pattern); Freiman v. Arizona World Nurseries Ltd., No.
86 Civ. 9834 (KC) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 1990) (finding fraudulent scheme lasting few months
satisfied H.. Inc. standards); Obee v. Teleshare Inc., 725 F. Supp. 913 (E.D. Mich. 1989)
(finding that telephone conversations, over two-year period, fulfilled continuity plus relation-
ship requirements set out in H.J. Inc.); Eichenholtz v. Brennan, No. 88-515 (JCL) (D.NJ. filed
July 27, 1989) (holding alleged acts of securities fraud committed over period of several years
sufficient for pattern under standard set out in H.. Inc.); Klein v. Churchill Coal Corp., No. 84
Civ. 6509 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 1989) (holding that repeated acts of wire and mail fraud consti-
tute RICO pattern, in light of Court's "expansive definition" of pattern in H.J. Inc., because
acts were "proximate in time and allegedly committed to advance a common purpose" of
defrauding plaintiff investors and defendants' alleged persistence in conduct over several
years and through multiple investment programs supplied continuity); Perez-Rubio v. Wyck-
off, 718 F. Supp. 217 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (concluding that comprehensive scheme spanning six-
year period fulfilled H.. Inc. pattern test); Dooner v. NMI Ltd., 725 F. Supp. 153 (S.D.N.Y.
1989) (finding predicate acts extending over 18-month period sufficient for pattern); see also
Marshall-Silver Constr. Co. v. Mendel, 894 F.2d 593 (3d Cir. 1990) (affirming dismissal for
lack of continuity necessary for pattern); Fiorentino v. Converse, 884 F.2d 1383 (3d Cir. 1989)
(finding businessman's alleged fraudulent scheme to transfer corporate assets to be "isolated
short-term conduct" falling short of providing continuity necessary for pattern); Parcoil Corp.
v. NOWSCO Well Serv. Ltd., 887 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1989) (affirming dismissal of four month
scam involving 17 predicate acts as lacking continuity required for post-H.J. Inc. pattern);
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the H.J. Inc. decision will substantially contract the scope of RICO.
It appears, however, that the Court's decision has not substantially
altered the precedents on which the courts rely.' 3 5 Some courts are
even interpreting H.J. Inc. as broadening, not limiting, the pattern
element.136
Another significant consequence of H.J. Inc. is that it added the
terms "closed-ended" and "open-ended" continuity to the judicial
vocabulary.13 7 The use of these terms focuses attention on the du-
ration of the illegal scheme.138 Post-H.J. Inc. cases reveal that illegal
activity ranging in duration from one and one-half years to nine
Menasco Inc. v. Wasserman, 886 F.2d 68 (4th Cir. 1989) (using "common-sensical fact-spe-
cific approach" set forth by H.J. Inc. Court, pattern was not established by alleged scheme that
lasted approximately one year and involved oil opportunities sold at five times their worth);
Sutherland v. O'Malley, 882 F.2d 1196 (7th Cir. 1989) (determining that alleged multiple acts
of mail fraud did not fulfill H.J. Inc.'s continuity requirement and this did not constitute "pat-
tern of racketeering activity"); Management Computer Serv., Inc. v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie &
Co., 883 F.2d 48 (7th Cir. 1989) (determining that unauthorized copying of computer pro-
gram involving single victim, one transaction between parties, and, at most, two predicate acts
failed to fulfill pattern requirement as construed in H.J. Inc.); Triad Assoc. v. Chicago Hous.
Auth., No. 88-1353 (7th Cir., Dec. 26, 1989) (dismissing for insufficient allegations of pattern
despite repeated acts of mail and wire fraud); Phelps v. Wichita Eagle-Beacon, 886 F.2d 1262
(10th Cir. 1989) (using closed- or open-ended continuity language from H.J. Inc., court held
that newspaper publication of two allegedly defamatory articles about attorney on same day,
researched near time of publication, did not form pattern); Trundy v. Strumsky, 729 F. Supp.
178 (D. Mass. 1990) (ruling alleged nine month scheme to obtain interest in firm lacked con-
tinuity and failed to establish pattern); Service Eng'g Co. v. Southwest Marine, Inc., 719 F.
Supp. 1500 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (applying continuity concepts derived from H.. Inc., court held
that allegedly fraudulent acts carried out by shipbuilding company over few weeks and
months did not constitute "pattern of racketeering activity"); Pyramid Sec. Ltd. v. Interna-
tional Bank, No. 87-3541 (CRR) (D.D.C. Dec. 19, 1989) (dismissing suit involving stock
churning episode lasting three months for lack of continuity); Hutchinson v. Wickes Co., 726
F. Supp. 1315 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (finding alleged acts over two year period against plan buyer
insufficient for pattern); Arcos Management Corp. v. Aguilera, No. 89 C 4320 (N.D. Ill. Aug.
25, 1989) (concluding that, under continuity standard elucidated in H.J. Inc., performer who
failed to show up at two concerts did not engage in pattern of racketeering); Orchard Hills
Coop. Apts., Inc. v. Germania Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 720 F. Supp. 127 (C.D. Ill. 1989)
(briefing all issues raised by H.J. Inc. including those of constitutional dimension, but failing
to reach constitutional issue because action was dismissed for lack of pattern demonstrating
requisite relationship or continuity); Disandro-Smith & Assoc. v. Edron Copier Serv., Inc.,
722 F. Supp. 912 (D.R.I. 1989) (dismissing complaint after finding inadequate allegations of
closed-ended continuity).
135. See Orchard Hills Coop. Apts., Inc. v. Germania Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 720 F. Supp.
127, 130 (C.D. Ill. 1989) (noting H.J. Inc. does "little, if anything, to change Seventh Circuit
precedent" upon which the Illinois District Court relies); Eichenholtz v. Brennan, No. 88-515
(JLC) (D.NJ. July 27, 1989) (noting H.J. Inc. could be read in harmony with Third Circuit
decision in Barticheck v. Fidelity Union Bank, 832 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1987)); see also Jost, supra
note 3, at 9, col. 6 (reporting G. Robert Blakey's opinion that H.J. Inc. decision will not change
definition of pattern in most circuit courts).
136. See, e.g., Swistock v. E.L. Jones, 884 F.2d 755, 758 (3d Cir. 1989) (stating that
although before H.. Inc. plaintiffs may only have had state law fraud case, court must now
give allegations broader interpretation); Landoil Resources Corp. v. Alexander & Alexander
Servs., Inc., No. 87 Civ. 8133 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 1989) (remarking that H.. Inc. Court pro-
vided "expansive" definition of "pattern of racketeering activity").
137. HJ. Inc., 109 S. Ct. 2893, 2902 (1989) (formulating open- and closed-ended con-
tinuity concepts).
138. IdL at 2902 (explaining that series of related predicates that extend over substantial
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years fulfilled the pattern requirement, 3 9 whereas illegal activity
ranging in duration from a few days to approximately two years did
not. 140
Inviting constitutional challenge to RICO is another significant
consequence of H.J. Inc. In the five month period following H.J.
Inc., RICO was attacked on vagueness grounds in three civil
cases. 14 1 In the only case that reached the constitutional issue, the
Southern District of New York held that Justice Scalia's concurring
opinion in H.J. Inc. did not provide a formal legal basis to justify
declaring RICO unconstitutional.142 In addition, vagueness chal-
lenges involving RICO's pattern element failed in four post-H.J. Inc.
criminal cases. 143 Interestingly, the First and Third Circuits demon-
strated a willingness to find the continuity and relationship neces-
sary for a pattern in the relationship of the predicate acts to the
"enterprise."' 144 According to the First and Third Circuits, a vague-
ness challenge to RICO is more likely to succeed in a case involving
a legitimate business than in a case involving an organized crime
"family" or widespread public corruption.
145
Although judicial interpretations of the pattern requirement con-
tinue to evolve in an unclear and inconsistent manner, relief may
period of time demonstrates continuity, and that series of predicates that involve threat of
continuity fulfill open-ended continuity requirement regardless of duration).
139. See Cemar Inc. v. Nissan Motor Corp., No. 87-165 (D. Del. Jan. 8, 1990) (noting that
schemes were conducted for nine years); Landoil Resources Corp. v. Alexander & Alexander
Servs., Inc., No. 87 Civ. 8133 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 1989) (noting that fraudulent activity per-
sisted for over one and one-half years).
140. See Phelps v. Witchita Eagle-Beacon, 886 F.2d 1262, 1273 (10th Cir. 1989) (discuss-
ing alleged scheme by newspaper to defame attorney by publishing two articles on same day);
Service Eng'g Co. v. Southwest Marine, Inc., 719 F. Supp. 1500 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (involving
alleged fraudulent activity that extended over only few weeks or months); Hutchinson v.
Wickes Co., 726 F. Supp. 1315, 1320 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (finding acts over two-year period insuf.
ficient for pattern).
141. Newmeyer v. Philatelic Leasing Ltd., 888 F.2d 385, 397-98 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding
that constitutional issue should be considered by district court); Minpeco S.A. v. Hunt, 724 F.
Supp. 259, 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (denying motion to declare RICO void for vagueness);
Orchard Hills Coop. Apartments, Inc. v. Germania Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 720 F. Supp. 127,
132 (C.D. 111. 1989) (avoiding constitutional issue because case dismissed on alternate
grounds).
142. Minpeco S.A. v. Hunt, 724 F. Supp. 259, 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). See supra notes 105,
122 and accompanying text (identifying Justice Scalia's concerns about majority decision in
H.J. Inc.).
143. United States v. Glecier, No. 88-3417, slip op. at 1 n.1 (7th Cir.Jan. 8, 1991) (agree-
ing with First and Third Circuits that RICO is constitutional in public corruption case);
United States v. Woods, 915 F.2d 854, 863-64 (3d Cir. 1990) (finding "hardcore" political
corruption fulfilled pattern requirement "by any standard"); United States v. Pungitore, 910
F.2d 1084, 1104-05 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding person of ordinary intelligence would realize that
Scarfo crime family's illegal activities constituted pattern); United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d
1169, 1180 (1st Cir. 1990) (stating that RICO may be vague in some contexts but not in case
involving Patriarca crime family).
144. Pungiore, 910 F.2d at 1104; Anguilo, 897 F.2d at 1180.
145. Woods, 915 F.2d at 864; Pungitore, 910 F.2d at 1105; Anguilo, 897 F.2d at 1180.
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appropriately come from a non-judicial forum. Congress, well
aware of the extensive applications of RICO, is considering amend-
ing the statute.
IV. CONGRESSIONAL PROPOSALS TO AMEND RICO
Congress has proposed legislation that attempts to reassert the
original goals of RICO. H.R. 1046, introduced on February 22,
1989, and its identical counterpart, S. 438, introduced the next day,
are known as the RICO Reform Acts of 1989.146 The proposals,
however, only address certain issues raised in private civil RICO liti-
gation. 147 Specific issues arising out of civil actions brought by the
government and criminal RICO actions are not addressed in the
bills. 148 Similarly, the proposed bills do not address the fundamen-
tal definitions of "pattern of racketeering activity" and
"enterprise."1
4 9
The bills' twelve main provisions can be summarized as follows:
1) codifying the preponderance of the evidence burden of proof for
all suits brought by the government; 150 2) adding new predicate of-
fenses; 51 3) providing for international service of process;152 4) re-
ducing recovery from treble damages to actual damages for Indian
tribes, labor unions, businesses, non-profit organizations, and indi-
viduals other than consumers victimized by patterns of criminal con-
duct, 153 but permitting recovery of actual and punitive damages by
any person who suffers bodily injury from a RICO violation; 154 5)
permitting punitive damages plus attorneys' fees for unreasonably
burdened or victimized consumers;' 55 6) eliminating treble damage
recoveries when state or federal securities or commodities laws pro-
146. H.R. 1046, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); S.438, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. (1989) [here-
inafter "RICO Reform Acts"]. But see Blakey, Possible Amendments to "The RICO Reform Act of
1989" (H.R. 1046), 5 Civil RICO Rep. (BNA) No. 11, at 1 (Aug. 8, 1989) (asserting that "The
RICO Reform, Defendant's Protection" is more appropriate title of proposed legislation be-
cause it is sharply tilted in defendant's favor and inhibits crime victims' ability to vindicate
their rights).
147. RICO Reform Acts, supra note 146; see DeConcini Rejects Suggestion, supra note 12, at 4
(recognizing AFL-CIO representative's observation that issues raised by bills are limited in
scope and that broader issues may need to be raised in the future).
148. RICO Reform Acts, supra note 146.
149. Id.
150. Il § 4.
151. Id. § 2. The predicates proposed to amend section 1961(1) include acts sanctioned
by federal statute that relate to forging of treasury or other securities, fraud and other activi-
ties in connection with access devices, destruction of aircraft, protection of foreign officials,
and counterfeiting. Id.
152. Id. § 5.
153. Id. § 4.
154. Id.
155. Id.
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vide a remedy,1 56 while not restricting the government's ability as a
civil plaintiff to recover treble damages;157 7) conditioning a victim's
right to recover treble damages on whether the defendant was previ-
ously convicted of a felony "based on the same conduct upon which
the plaintiff's action is based"; 15 8 8) authorizing procedural delays
for regulated industries based on their use of an "affirmative de-
fense" that they acted in good faith and in reliance upon the deci-
sions of a federal or state agency;1 59 9) extending the statute of
limitations to six years after accrual of the cause of action for suits
by the United States;' 60 10) prohibiting the use of terms such as
"racketeer," "pattern of racketeering activity," and "organized
crime" in civil actions that fail to allege a crime of violence; 16' 11)
placing exclusive jurisdiction over RICO actions in federal
courts;162 and 12) imposing stricter pleading requirements. 6 3
Specific provisions in the bills received varying levels of support
from a diverse reform coalition, ranging from business corporations
to organized labor.' 64 Moreover, reform groups and the business
sector, with strong lobbies, recommended further reform in accord-
ance with their special interests. 65 The House Committee on
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id § 4; see DeConcini Rdects Suggestion, supra note 12, at 2 (commenting that DOJ pre-
fers requiring that conviction be for RICO or specified act of racketeering, thus preventing
confusion and vagueness challenges regarding the relatedness of prior conviction).
159. RICO Reform Acts, supra note 146, § 4.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. § 6.
163. Id. § 4. On April 24, 1990, S. 438 was amended to exclude first amendment pro-
tected activity from RICO's scope. RICO Reform Act of 1989, S. 438, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1990). Organizing, participating, or supporting any "non-violent demonstration, assembly,
protest, rally or other similar form of public speech" that is not undertaken for economic or
commercial gain was excluded from RICO's definition of "racketeering activity." Id.
164. AFL-CIO, American Bar Association (ABA), Business/Labor Coalition to Reform
Civil RICO, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), G. Robert Blakey, National Asso-
ciation of Attorneys General (NAAG), Public Citizen's Congress Watch, The American Bank-
ers Association, The National Association of Securities and Commercial Law Attorneys
(NASCAT), DOJ, and U.S. Public Interest Research Group (U.S. PIRG) have been particularly
active in the reform effort. For a discussion of the groups that support specific provisions of
S. 438, see generally DeConcini Roects Suggestion, supra note 12; SEC Supports Move to Cut Overlap
Between RICO Remedies, Securities Law, 5 Civil RICO Rep. (BNA) No. 9, at 1 (July 25, 1989)
[hereinafter SEC Supports]; Anderson & Van Atta, Don't Gut RICO, Wash. Post, Apr. 30, 1989,
at A20, col. 1.
165. See DeConcini Rdects Suggestion, supra note 12, at 3 (including NAAG recommendations
that S. 438 provide "true parens patriae standing to allow government entities to redress the
rights of victims too vulnerable to be effective plaintiffs; require greater specificity in pleading
the pattern and enterprise elements as well as the predicate acts of fraud; impose financial
counter-incentives to bringing a frivolous RICO claim."). But see SEC Supports, supra note 164,
at 2 (reporting commentator's belief that Federal Rules of Civil Procedure's sanction for frivo-
lous litigation provides "ample safeguards" against those who misuse RICO). The ABA rec-
ommended that the pejorative term "punitive damages" be replaced with the less
inflammatory term "additional damages"; a judge rather than a jury determine the extent of
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Crime incorporated some of the recommendations, including a defi-
nition of pattern into H.R. 5111, a bill that supplants H.R. 1046.166
The new House bill is known as the RICO Amendments Act of
1990 and has nine key provisions.1 67 The first is defining "pattern
of racketeering activity" as requiring at least two acts "which are
related to one another or to a common external organizing principal
and constitute or pose a threat of continuing racketeering activ-
ity."116 8 Two or more acts "which are part of a single episode"
would constitute a single act of racketeering.1 69 The remaining pro-
visions are: declaring that the scope of RICO's treble damage rem-
edy is "extraordinary" and may be used only when it "dearly serves
damage awards; and a three-year limitation period tied to the time a cause of action accrued
be imposed. DeConcini Roects Suggestion, supra, at 4. The AFL-CIO proposed that "the most
desirable response" is to "repeal the private civil RICO action in its entirety." Id. at 4. NAS-
CAT felt that Congress should adopt "more moderate measure that will leave civil RICO
more intact." Supporters of RICO, supra note 34, at 2. NASCAT suggested the name of the
statute be changed in private civil actions and that a business dispute exception to the rule of
automatic trebling be created. Id. Other commentators suggested that proposed legislation
could be improved by "avoiding adding further complexities to an already complex statute."
SEC Supports, supra, at 3. U.S. PIRG suggested tightening the definition of pattern. DeConcini
Reects Suggestion, supra, at 3. G. Robert Blakey, who was the chief counsel to the Subcommit-
tee on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the United States in 1969-1970 when the Organized
Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941 (1970) was processed, suggested
that the Committee enact remedial legislation that addresses the "definition of 'pattern,' 'ne-
cessities' in pre-trial restraints in forfeitures, and litigation abuses in the First Amendment
area." SEC Supports, supra, at 3. Blakey is active in the reform movement and prepared two
comprehensive proposals. Blakey, Alternative Legislative Proposals to "The RICO Reform Act of
1989", 5 Civil RICO Rep. (BNA) No. 12, at 1, 1-12 (Aug. 15, 1989) [hereinafter Blakey-
Alternative Legislation]. The first proposal retains the basic design of the proposed legislation
and the second completely re-designs the proposed legislation. Id.
166. H.R. 5111, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990). H.R. 5111 was introduced onJune 21,
1990, by Rep. WilliamJ. Hughes, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Crime. Before H.J. Inc.,
some reformers suggested that any RICO reform bill address the definition of pattern. See
supra note 165 (identifying these commentators). After the H.J. Inc. Court invited Congress to
define further the term "pattern of racketeering activity," movements to include a new or
revised pattern definition in a RICO reform bill gained momentum. Hughes quoted the lan-
guage ofJustices Brennan and Scalia in H.J. Inc. that urged a legislative definition of pattern
and stated that "[it would appear ... that [Congress] should attempt to clarify the 'pattern of
racketeering' aspect of the statute so that its original goals are not lost in an ever expanding
interpretation of its imprecise language." Id.
167. H.R. 5111, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., § 1 (1990).
168. Id. § 2.
169. Id. The new definition of pattern would read as follows:
"pattern of racketeering activity" requires at least two acts of racketeering activity
(which are related to one another or to a common external organizing principle and
constitute or pose a threat of continuing racketeering), one of which occurred after
the effective date of this chapter and the last of which occurred within ten years (ex-
cluding any period of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeer-
ing activity, but two or more acts which are part of a single episode constitute a
single act for the purposes of this subsection.
Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1988). DOJ supports the codification of the single episode rule as it
will not change the way the department reviews or authorizes proposed RICO actions. Tele-
phone Interview with Paul E. Coffey, Deputy Chief, Organized Crime and Racketeering Sec-
tion, Criminal Division, United States Department ofJustice (Nov. 1, 1990). See supra note 45
(discussing single episode rule).
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the public interest" and "provides appropriate deterrence against
repetition of egregious criminal conduct"; 170 requiring particularity
of pleading for all elements of RICO;' 7' establishing the court as a
"gatekeeper" for treble damage claims under civil RICO; 172 explic-
itly imposing sanctions for frivolous suits; 173 changing the burden of
proof in civil RICO litigation from a preponderance of the evidence
to clear and convincing evidence; 174 granting exclusive jurisdiction
to federal courts for civil actions;' 75 explicitly making the first
amendment protections applicable to RICO; 76 and allowing retro-
active application of the Amendments Act.'
77
RICO's broad scope is due, in part, to its use of vague terms such
as "pattern of racketeering activity" and "enterprise" that allow
plaintiffs and prosecutors to plead easily the requisite elements of a
RICO cause of action.' 78 The H.j. Inc. Court failed to restrict sub-
stantially the definition of pattern. 179 The RICO reform bill pro-
posed by the Senate, which does not address the definition of
pattern, will fail to limit sufficiently the application of civil RICO.
The new RICO reform bill proposed by the House, which amends
the definition of pattern by codifying the H.J. Inc. Court's ambigu-
ous wording modified only by the practice of the Department ofJus-
tice, °80 must rely on additional amendments such as the gatekeeper
concept to achieve a more limited application of civil RICO. The
House reliance on numerous amendments to achieve a more limited
170. H.R. 5111, § 3.
171. Id. § 4.
172. Id. § 5. At a hearing, the plaintiff must show that the civil RICO suit is "extraordi-
nary," "clearly serves the public interest," and is appropriate to "deter future egregious con-
duct" in order to pass the "gate." Id. If the plaintiffcannot show the latter or meet a number
of other criteria, including that the defendant was convicted of RICO or one of its predicate
offenses, the court is required to dismiss the RICO suit. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. § 6.
175. Id. § 7.
176. Id. § 8.
177. Id. § 10. For an excellent analysis of H.R. 5111 prepared by the office of Representa-
tive John Conyers, Jr. (D-Mich.), see generally Memorandum on H.R. 5111: The RICO Amend-
ments Act of 1990 Part I, 6 Civil RICO Rep. (BNA) No. 14, at 6 (Sept. 4, 1990); Memorandum on
H.R. 5111: The Rico Amendments Act of 1990 Part 11, 6 Civil RICO Rep. (BNA) No. 15, at 4 (Sept.
11, 1990). For a discussion of the constitutionality of retroactivity in the RICO context, see
RICO Reform Act of 1989: Hearings on H.R. 1046 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm.
on theJudiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 2-13 (1989) [hereinafter Subcommittee Hearings] (testi-
mony of Barry B. Direnfeld, Senior Partner, Rivkin, Radler, Dunne & Bayh, and legislative
counsel to Business/Labor Coalition to Reform Civil RICO) (concluding that "remedial" or
"'curative" legislation typically is applied retroactively to pending legislation and that doing
so, in RICO context, is sound legal and public policy).
178. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4)-(5) (1988) (defining "pattern of racketeering activity" and
"enterprise"); see also supra note 27 (reciting pleading requirements).
179. See supra notes 91-99, 108-120 and accompanying text (analyzing H.J Inc. Court's
holding and exploring scope of closed- and open-ended continuity concepts).
180. See supra note 45 (discussing DOJ application of single episode rule).
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application of civil RICO may not be prudent, given the wide dispar-
ity between the House and the Senate as to how much reform is
needed.18 1 In other words, there is no guarantee that the Senate
will want to erect a "gate," without which the proposed definition of
pattern will not substantially curb inappropriate uses of RICO.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Available Options
Forty percent of the post-Sedima (pre-H.J. Inc.) civil RICO filings
were dismissed, ' 8 2 often imposing tremendous costs on inappropri-
ate defendants. This high rate of dismissal strongly suggests the
need for civil RICO reform. Indeed, there is little disagreement that
something is wrong; 183 the disagreement centers on how to remedy
the wrong.
Many options exist that could prevent the use of RICO to coerce
settlements and sanction inappropriate defendants. 184 Five ap-
proaches that have not yet been incorporated in the RICO reform
bills but are discussed frequently at RICO conferences and in spe-
cialized RICO publications 185 are briefly examined and critiqued in
this section. The first option is to abolish civil RICO altogether,
leaving the government and private parties to resort to other stat-
utes for relief. Although other statutes may provide some relief,
RICO provides powerful equitable relief.18 6 RICO allows restruc-
181. See 136 CONG. REC. S16302, S16311 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1990) (statement of Sen.
Humphrey) (noting that differing approaches taken in House and Senate will stall passage of
RICO reform bill). H.R. 5111 did not make it to the floor for a vote by the full Judiciary
Committee before Congress adjourned on October 28, 1990. Telephone Interview with Ed
O'Connell, Counsel to the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime (Oct. 31, 1990).
182. Blakey-CATO Conference, supra note 123, at 17 (arguing that dismissals are result
of circuit courts' failure to play "new game" created by Sedima according to "old rules" for
construing statutes) (citing Blakey & Cessar, Equitable Relief Under Civil RICO, 62 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 526, 620 (1987)).
183. Even consistent supporters of RICO have advocated RICO reform. See Blakey-A-
ternative Legislation, supra note 165 (proposing two models for reform).
184. See Mansnerus, As Racketeering Law Expands, So Does Pressure to Rein It In, N.Y. Times,
March 12, 1989, at 1, col. I (describing how former United States Attorney Rudolph W. Giu-
liani threatened to seize Drexel Burnam Lambert's assets in order to coerce settlement before
any misconduct was formally charged against its executives).
185. See, e.g., CATO Institute Conference on RICO, Rights and the Constitution (Oct. 18,
1989, Grand Hyatt Hotel, Washington, D.C.); Practicing Law Institute Civil RICO Seminar
(Nov. 13-14, 1989, Hyatt Regency Hotel, San Francisco, Cal.); Practicing Law Institute Civil
RICO Seminar (Dec. 7-8, 1989, Peat Marwick Main & Co. Executive Education Center, New
York, N.Y.); New Justice Authority Proposed to Screen Private RICO Claims, Civil RICO Rep. (BNA)
No. 49, at 5 (May 16, 1989) [hereinafter New Justice Authority].
186. See Program Fraud Civil Remedies Act of 1986, 31 U.S.C. § 3802 (1988) (allowing
United States to collect treble damages for civil injury); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1988)
(allowing any "person" whose business or property was injured because of antitrust law viola-
tions to recover treble damages and reasonable attorneys' fees). In addition, plaintiffs have a
host of remedies in state court. But see 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a)-(d) (1988) (allowing plaintiffs and
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turing of corrupt organizations, removal of "puppets," and appoint-
ment of trustees so that industries infiltrated by organized crime
may be redeemed. 187 There have been cases, particularly those
brought by private parties, that sound in abuse, yet there are many
civil cases brought by the government demonstrating that RICO can
effectively combat organized crime. 188 Therefore, abolishing civil
RICO altogether will frustrate a serious effort to eradicate organ-
ized crime.
The second option is to establish a central authority in the De-
partment of Justice to screen private civil RICO claims. 189 Those
not meeting certain minimum criteria would be barred.1 90 One pro-
posed objective standard is whether a criminal prosecutor "in a
world of unlimited resources" would have filed charges. 191 Requir-
ing executive branch review of private RICO claims, however, would
defeat a significant objective of the statute-to enable private plain-
tiffs to attack racketeering "enterprises" independently of the gov-
ernment.1 92 In addition, requiring the executive branch to carry
such a burden would strain its resources.19 3 Finally, the exercise of
such discretion by the executive branch might create a separation of
powers problem and result in a quasi-judicial proceeding wherein
the prospective plaintiff must prove his case to the satisfaction of the
executive branch, whose decision to deny the right to sue might it-
self be subject to judicial review.194
prosecutors federal forum and United States to institute proceedings for divestiture, dissolu-
tion, and reorganization of any "enterprise").
187. Id. § 1964(a).
188. See United States v. Lucchese Organized Crime Family, No. CV-891848 (E.D.N.Y.
June 7, 1989) (seeking to eliminate racketeering influence over Long Island garbage disposal
industry in action naming 112 defendants and Lucchese and Gambino crime families); United
States v. Bonanno Organized Crime Family, 683 F. Supp. 1411, 1419 (E.D.N.Y. 1988), aff'd,
879 F.2d 20 (2d Cir. 1989) (seeking to enjoin organized crime family from engaging in certain
illegal activity allegedly including 199 acts of racketeering and to appoint trustees and re-
ceiver to oversee union and eight businesses respectively); United States v. Local 560, 581 F.
Supp. 279, 337 (D.N.J. 1984), aff'd, 780 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1985) (enjoining two remaining
members of criminal group from having any future contacts with Local 560, removing entire
executive board of Local, and appointing trustee to remain until free elections were held), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1140 (1986).
189. See New Justice Authority, supra note 185 (reporting law professor's suggestion that
"having federal prosecutors screen private complaints is a sensible way to limit private civil
RICO").
190. Id.
191. Id. at 6.
192. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988) (creating private attorneys general).
193. New Justice Authority, supra note 185, at 6 (quoting commentator who acknowledges
resources expended in screening and suggests plaintiff's lawyer is better screener).
194. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988) (providing for judicial re-
view of administrative actions at behest of aggrieved party); see also New Justice Authority, supra
note 185, at 6 (noting leading RICO defense attorney's lack of confidence in federal prosecu-
tors' judgement).
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The third option is to reduce the list of predicate acts that accu-
mulate to form a RICO pattern. Removing fraud offenses from the
list of predicate acts,19 5 for example, would eliminate white collar
offenses and many potentially abusive cases. The problem with
more narrowly defining the predicate acts is that professional crimi-
nal associations often engage in fraudulent activity and non-violent
crimes.1
96
The fourth option is to excise, amend, and rename the civil provi-
sions of RICO for private litigants, leaving the criminal provisions
and the government's ability to use the civil provisions intact.'9 7
The "new" statute would not be linked with RICO and would not
refer to racketeers. Such a statute was proposed for inclusion
among other civil provisions of the United States Code.'98 Under
this option, the government could continue to use the powerful re-
organization provisions of civil RICO. 199 The "new" statute could
provide for double damages to preserve the incentive for private
parties to challenge "enterprises" that can and do engage in perva-
sive fraud,200 but discourage abuse. While the assumption behind
this proposal appears to question appropriately whether treble dam-
ages and attorneys' fees have motivated private parties to use RICO
against wholly illegitimate "enterprises," the broad list of predicate
acts suggests that Congress intended that private actions not be lim-
ited to those against "enterprises" that engage only in fraudulent
activity.20'
The fifth option is to amend the current definition of pattern with
more precise and substantive language. Increased precision and
substance would safeguard the pattern element against a successful
void for vagueness attack.20 2 It would also provide potential de-
fendants with greater notice that their illegal conduct is subject to
195. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1988) (defining "racketeering activity" by enumerating
crimes that serve as RICO predicates).
196. See United States v. Rastelli, 870 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1989) (affirming, inter alia, defend-
ants' (including Bonanno organized crime family) conviction for conspiring to commit and
committing mail fraud); United States v. Indelicato, 865 F.2d 1370 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 56 (1989) (affirming defendant's conviction for conspiracy to conduct operations of La
Cosa Nostra "Commission").
197. See CATO Institute Conference on RICO, Rights and the Constitution, Address by
Joseph diGenova: The Powers of the Prosecutor (Oct. 18, 1989) (proposing change that will
limit private parties' access to civil RICO while keeping tools for federal prosecutors intact).
198. Id. The proposed name of the statute was "Complex Fraud Statute of 1990." Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988) (allowing any injured "person" to recover treble dam-
ages and attorneys' fees); 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (listing predicate acts).
202. See supra notes 121-29 and accompanying text (examining pattern element's suscepti-
bility to attack for vagueness).
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sanction under RICO, and reduce the use of RICO against legiti-
mate businesses.
Although abolishing private civil RICO actions is the most com-
prehensive means to halt civil RICO abuse, redefining RICO's pat-
tern element is a less drastic yet adequate means to reduce the
number of frivolous suits. 203 In formulating a new definition of pat-
tern, language found in state RICO statutes offers useful guidance.
B. State RICO Statutes
Twenty-seven states20 4 and Puerto Rico 205 enacted statutes
modeled after the federal RICO statute.20 6 Of these twenty-eight
"little" RICO statutes, twenty-five use and define the word pat-
tern.20 7 The other three state statutes omit the term pattern
203. See supra note 33 (describing cases in which pleadings are clearly insufficient on their
face or presumably initiated to embarrass or harass opponent).
204. See ARz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-2312 to -2317 (1989); California Control of Profits
of Organized Crime Act, CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 186-186.10 (West 1989); Colorado Organized
Crime Control Act, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-17-101 to -109 (1986 & Supp. 1989); Corrupt
Organizations and Racketeering Activity Act, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53-393 to -403 (West
1985); The Delaware Racketeer-Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 11, §§ 1501-1511 (1985); Florida Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act,
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 895.01-895.09 (West Supp. 1989); Georgia Racketeer Influenced and Cor-
rupt Organizations Act, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-14-1 to -15 (1988 & Supp. 1989); HAw. REV.
STAT. §§ 842-1 to -12 (1985 & Supp. 1988); Racketeering Act, IDAHO CODE §§ 18-7801 to -
7805 (1987 & Supp. 1989); Narcotics Profit Forfeiture Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 56 1/2, 1651-
1660 (Smith-Hurd 1985 & Supp. 1989); Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations,
IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-45-6-1 to -2 (West 1986 & Supp. 1989), 34-4-30.5-1 to .5-6 (West 1983
& Supp. 1989); Louisiana Drug Racketeering Act, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15:1351-:1356
(West Supp. 1989); Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act, Miss. CODE ANN.
§§ 97-43-1 to -11 (Supp. 1989); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 207.350 to -.520 (1986 & Supp. 1989);
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:41-1 to -6.2 (West 1982 & Supp. 1989); Racketeering Act, N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 30-42-1 to -6 (Supp. 1989); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 460.00 to -.80 (McKinney 1989);
North Carolina Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 75D-1 to -14 (1987 & Supp. 1989); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.106.1-01 to .1-08 (1985 &
Supp. 1989); OHio REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2923.31 to -.36 (Page 1987 & Supp. 1988); OR. REV.
STAT. §§ 166.715 to .735 (1989); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 911 (Purdon 1980); R.I. GEN.
LAws §§ 7-15-1 to -11 (1985); The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act,
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-12-201 to -210 (Supp. 1989); Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act, UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 76-10-1601 to -1609 (Supp. 1989); Criminal Profiteering Act, WASH. REV.
CODE §§ 9A.82.010 to -.904 (1988 & Supp. 1989); Wisconsin Organized Crime Control Act,
Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 946.80 to -.87 (West Supp. 1989).
205. Act Against Organized Crime, P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 25, §§ 971-971s (1980 & Supp.
1988). A recently published memorandum notes that "[t]wenty-nine states have RICO stat-
utes." Memorandum on H.R. 5111: The RICO Amendments Act of 1990 Part /, 6 Civil RICO Rep.
(BNA) No. 15, at 5 (Sept. 11, 1990) (emphasis added).
206. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988); see Strasser, More States Are Adopting Racketeering Laws,
NAT'L LJ., Mar. 20, 1989, at 34, col. 1 (stating that "[a]lthough state RICO laws receive little
attention ... they give state and local prosecutors the same enormous powers as the federal
law").
207. See, CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.2(b) (West 1989) (providing that " '[p]attern of criminal
profiteering activity' means engaging in at least two incidents of criminal profiteering activity
... which... (1) Have the same or similar purpose, result, principals, victims, or methods of
commission, or are otherwise interrelated by distinguishing characteristics"); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 18-17-103(3) (1989) (providing that " '[p]attern of racketeering activity' means engag-
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ing in at least two acts of racketeering activity which are related to the conduct of the enter-
prise, if at least one of such acts occurred within ten years (excluding... imprisonment) after
a prior act of racketeering activity"); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-394(e) (West 1985) (provid-
ing that" '[p]attern of racketeering activity' means engaging in at least two incidents of racke-
teering activity that have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or
methods of commission or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics, includ-
ing a nexus to the same enterprise, and are not isolated incidents, provided the latter or last of
such incidents occurred... within five years after a prior incident of racketeering activity");
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1502(5) (1985) (providing that "'[p ]attern of racketeering activity'
shall mean 2 or more incidents of conduct: a. That: 1. Constitute racketeering activity; 2. Are
related to the affairs of the enterprise; 3. Are not so closely related to each other and con-
nected in point of time and place that they constitute a single event; and b. Where: ... 2. The
last incident of conduct occurred within 10 years after a prior occasion of conduct; and 3. As
to criminal charges, but not as to civil proceedings, at least I of the incidents of conduct
constituted a felony"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 895.02(4) (West Supp. 1989) (providing that
" '[p~attem of racketeering activity' means engaging in at least two incidents of racketeering
conduct that have the same or similar intents, results, accomplices, victims, or methods of
commission or that otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not
isolated incidents, provided at least one of sich incidents occurred ... within 5 years after a
prior incident of racketeering conduct"); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-14-3(8) (Supp. 1989) (noting
that "[p]attern of racketeering activity" defined same as Florida statute, supra, except "pro-
vided ... the last of such incidents occurred within four years, excluding... imprisonment,
after the commission of a prior incident of racketeering activity"); IDAHo CODE § 18-7803(d)
(Supp. 1989) (defining "[p]attern of racketeering activity" same as Florida statute, supra); ILL.
ANN. STAT., Ch. 56 1/2, para. 1653(2)(b) (Smith-Hurd 1985) (providing that "'[p]attem of
narcotics activity' means 2 or more acts of narcotics activity of which at least 2 such acts were
committed within 5 years of each other. At least one of those acts of narcotics activity.., shall
be or shall have been punishable as a ... felony"); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-6-1 (West 1986)
(defining "[p]attern of racketeering activity" same as Florida statute, supra); LA. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 15:1352(C) (West Supp. 1989) (providing that" '[plattern of drug racketeering activ-
ity' means engaging in at least two incidents of drug racketeering activity that have the same
or similar intents, results, principals, victims, or methods of commission or otherwise are in-
terrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated incidents, provided at least
one of such incidents ... occurs within five years after a prior incident of drug racketeering
activity"); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-43-3(d) (Supp. 1989) (defining "[p]attern of racketeering
activity" same as Florida statute, supra); NEv. REv. STAT. § 207.390 (1986) (providing that
"'[r]acketeering activity' means engaging in at least two crimes related to racketeering" but
otherwise same as Florida statute, supra); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:41-1(2)(d) (West Supp. 1989)
(providing that " '[p]attern of racketeering activity' requires (1) Engaging in at least two inci-
dents of racketeering conduct... occurr[ing] within 10 years (excluding ... imprisonment)
after a prior incident of racketeering activity; and (2) A showing that the incidents of racke-
teering activity embrace criminal conduct that has either the same or similar purposes, results,
participants or victims or methods of commission or are otherwise interrelated by distinguish-
ing characteristics and are not isolated incidents"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-42-3(D) (Supp.
1989) (providing that" '[p]attern of racketeering activity' means engaging in at least two inci-
dents of racketeering with the intent of accomplishing any of the prohibited activities set forth
... provided.., the last of which occurred within five years after the commission of a prior
incident of racketeering"); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 460.10(4) (McKinney 1989) (providing that
"'[p]attern of criminal activity' means conduct engaged in by persons charged in an enter-
prise corruption count constituting three or more criminal acts that: (a) were committed
within ten years of the commencement of the criminal action; (b) are neither isolated inci-
dents, nor so closely related and connected in point of time or circumstance of commission as
to constitute a criminal offense or criminal transaction... and (c) are either: (i) related to one
another through a common scheme or plan or (ii) were committed, solicited, requested, im-
portuned or intentionally aided by persons acting with the mental culpability required for the
commission thereof and associated with or in the criminal enterprise"); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 75D-3(b) (1987) (defining "[p]attern of racketeering activity" same as Florida statute, supra,
except provided that "at least one other of such incidents occurred within a four-year period
... excluding ... imprisonment, after the commission of a prior incident of racketeering
activity"); N.D. GEN. CODE § 12.1-06.1-01(2)(d) (Supp. 1989) (providing that "'[p]attem of
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altogether. 208
Arizona, Hawaii, and Rhode Island, whose statutes do not use the
racketeering activity' requires at least two acts of racketeering activity ... the last of which
occurred within ten years, excluding... imprisonment, after the commission of a prior act of
racketeering activity"); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.3 1(E) (Page Supp. 1988) (providing that
" '[p]attern of corrupt activity' means two or more incidents of corrupt activity, whether or
not there has been a prior conviction, that are related to the affairs of the same enterprise, are
not isolated, and are not so closely related to each other and connected in time and place that
they constitute a single event... Unless any incident was an aggravated murder or murder,
the last of the incidents . . . shall occur within six years after the commission of any prior
incident forming the pattern, excluding.., imprisonment served by any person engaging in
the corrupt activity. For the purposes of the criminal penalties that may be imposed ... at
least one of the incidents forming the pattern shall constitute a felony"); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 166.715(4) (1989) (defining "[p]attern of racketeering activity" same as Florida statute,
supra); 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 911 (E)(h)(4) (1983) (providing that" '[p]attern of racketeer-
ing activity' refers to a course of conduct requiring two or more acts of racketeering activity
one of which occurred after the effective date of this section"); P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 25,
§ 971a(i) (Supp. 1988) (providing that "[p]attern of organized criminal activity ... requires at
least two (2) acts of organized criminal activity within a ten- (10-) year period ... [In] comput-
ing the ten (10-) year period . . . any jail term served by the accused shall be excluded");
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-12-203 (Supp. 1989) (defining "'[p]attern of racketeering activity'
same as Florida statute, supra, except "provided that at least one (1) of such incidents oc-
curred afterJuly 1, 1986, and that the last ofsuch incidents occurred within two (2) years after
a prior incident of racketeering conduct"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1602(2) (Supp. 1989)
(providing that" '[p]attern ofunlawful activity' means engaging in conduct which constitutes
the commission of at least three episodes of unlawful activity, which episodes are not isolated,
but have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commis-
sion, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics. Taken together, the epi-
sodes shall demonstrate continuing unlawful conduct and be related either to each other or to
the enterprise .... The most recent act constituting part of a pattern ... shall have occurred
within five years of the commission of the next preceding act alleged as part of the pattern");
WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.82.010(15) (Supp. 1989) (providing that" '[p]attern of criminal profi-
teering activity' means engaging in at least three acts of criminal profiteering ... the last of
which occurred within five years, excluding ... imprisonment, after the commission of the
earliest act of criminal profiteering. In order to constitute a pattern, the three acts must have
the same or similar intent, results, accomplices, principals, victims, or methods of commis-
sion, or be otherwise interrelated by distinguishing characteristics including a nexus to the
same enterprise, and must not be isolated events. However, in any civil proceedings ... by
any person other than the attorney general or county prosecuting attorney in which one or
more acts of fraud in the purchase or sale of securities are asserted as acts of criminal profi-
teering activity, it is a condition to civil liability.., that the defendant had been convicted in a
criminal proceeding of fraud in the purchase or sale of securities ... but such conviction need
not relate to any act or acts asserted as acts of criminal profiteering activity in such civil ac-
tion"); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 946.82(3) (West Supp. 1989) (providing that " '[p]attern of racke-
teering activity' means engaging in at least 3 incidents of racketeering activity that have the
same or similar intents, results, accomplices, victims or methods of commission or otherwise
are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics, provided ... the last of the incidents oc-
curred within 7 years after the first incident of racketeering activity. Acts occurring at the
same time and place which may form the basis for crimes punishable under more than one
statutory provision may count for only one incident of racketeering activity").
208. See Amz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2301(C)(2) (1989) (defining "criminal syndicate" as
"any combination of persons or enterprises engaging, or having the purpose of engaging, on
a continuing basis in conduct which violates any one or more provisions of any felony statute
of this state"); HAw. REV. STAT. §§ 842-1 to -12 (1985 & Supp. 1988) (failing to define pattern
or similar term); R.I. GEN. LAws § 7-15-2(a) (1985) (providing simply that "[iut shall be unlaw-
ful for any person who has knowingly received any income derived, directly or indirectly, from
a racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt, to use or invest, directly or
indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income in the acquisition of an
interest in, or the establishment or operation of any enterprise").
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word pattern, require proof of "racketeering," not proof of a pat-
tern, for a violation. 20 9 Hawaii and Rhode Island curtailed the
scope of such broad language by restricting the predicate acts that
constitute "racketeering" to violent crimes and felonies.210 By tai-
loring the predicate acts narrowly, the Hawaii and Rhode Island
statutes do not reach all the activity encompassed by the federal
RICO statute.21' In contrast, the Arizona statute enumerates more
predicate acts. 212 The Arizona statute is more expansive than fed-
eral RICO because it lacks a pattern requirement altogether and
provides a wider range of civil remedies.213
Many of the state RICO statutes that define pattern incorporate
language that has greater substance, a more definitive scope, and a
stronger emphasis on the concept of "continuity" than does the cor-
responding provision in the federal statute.214 For example, most of
the state RICO statutes specify what a pattern "means," 21 5 rather
than what a pattern "requires." 21 6 In addition, sixteen states em-
phasize "continuity" by mandating that the constituent elements of
a pattern occur over a time period less than the ten-year period stip-
ulated by federal RICO. 217 Most states stipulate a maximum separa-
tion of four or five years.218
The state RICO statutes' definitions of pattern vary subtly but sig-
nificantly from the federal definition. For example, under federal
RICO, "acts" are the core elements that accumulate to form the pat-
209. See ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-2301(D)(4) (1989) (defining "racketeering"); HAw.
REV. STAT. § 842-1 (1985) (defining "racketeering activity"); R.I. GEN. LAws § 7-15-la (1985)
(defining "racketeering activity").
210. HAw. REv. STAT. § 842-1 (1985); R.I. GEN. LAws § 7-15-1(a) (1985).
211. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1988) (enumerating predicates).
212. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2301(D)(4) (1989) (listing offenses including "leading
organized crime" and "resale of realty with intent to defraud" as predicate acts).
213. Id. § 13-2314 (providing private civil remedy, costs and reasonable attorneys' fees,
and parens patriae action). The Arizona Supreme Court emphasized that "the federal statute
... is more restrictive in scope" than Arizona's RICO statute. Arizona v. Pickrell, 136 Ariz.
589, 595, 667 P.2d 1304, 1310 (1983).
214. Compare supra note 28 (presenting federal RICO's definition of pattern) with supra
note 207 (presenting state RICO statutes' definitions of pattern).
215. See supra note 207 (providing following state statutes: California, Colorado, Con-
necticut, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Wash-
ington, and Wisconsin). But see N.D. CENrr. CODE § 12.1-06.1-01(2)(a) (Supp. 1989) (stating
pattern "requires" at least two acts); P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 25, § 971a(i) (Supp. 1988) (expres-
sing same).
216. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1988) (defining what pattern under federal RICO
"requires").
217. The separation of time for some of the states include: Connecticut (5 yrs.); Florida
(5 yrs.); Georgia (4 yrs.); Idaho (5 yrs.); Illinois (5 yrs.); Indiana (5 yrs.); Louisiana (5 yrs.);
Mississippi (5 yrs.); Nevada (5 yrs.); New Mexico (5 yrs.); North Carolina (4 yrs.); Ohio (6
yrs.); Oregon (5 yrs.); Utah (5 yrs.); Washington (5 yrs.); Wisconsin (7 yrs.). See supra note 207
(providing relevant sections of these state statutes).
218. Id.
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tern.2 19 In contrast, a majority of the state RICO statutes that de-
fine pattern require an aggregation of "incidents," not simply
"acts," to form the requisite pattern. 220 Delaware and Ohio provide
that the "incidents" cannot be "so closely related in time and place
that they constitute a single event." 221 Nevada counts "crimes,
'222
and the Utah statute requires multiple "episodes." 223 Moreover,
many states expressly provide that "isolated" conduct is not within
the scope of their respective statutes.2 24 Seven states require not
only that the requisite predicates be related to each other, but also
that they be related to the "enterprise."
225
As the various state RICO statutes demonstrate, there are many
different ways of defining the units that accumulate to form a pat-
tern and the necessary relationship among those units. The subtle
variations are significant because they affect whether a "pattern of
racketeering activity" may be proven. The more easily a pattern can
be proven, the broader RICO's scope will be.
Formal definition and common usage suggest that the terms "in-
cident," 226 "episode," 227 and "event" 228 are broader than the term
"act." 229 Numerous "acts" are required to constitute a single "inci-
dent," "episode," or "event." Thus, by referring to "incidents,"
"episodes," or "events," rather than to "acts," a legislature may
narrow the scope of a RICO statute.
219. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1988).
220. These states include: California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, In-
diana, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Ten-
nessee, and Wisconsin. See supra note 207 (providing statutes of these states).
221. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1502(5) (1985); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §i 2923.31(E) (Page
& Supp. 1988).
222. NEV. REV. STAT. § 207.390 (1986).
223. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1602(2) (Supp. 1989).
224. These states include: Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Louisiana, Mississippi, New
Jersey, New York, and Washington. See supra note 207 (quoting relevant sections of these
state "little" RICO statutes).
225. These states include: Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, New York, Ohio, Utah, and
Washington. See supra note 207 (quoting relevant sections of these "little" RICO statutes).
226. See BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 762 (6th ed. 1990) (defining incident as "anything
which .. .is connected ...with another, or connected for some purposes, though not
inseparably").
227. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 765 (1981) (defining episode
as "an occurrence... which may be viewed as distinctive and apart although part of a larger
or more comprehensive series"); see also Lipin Enters. Inc. v. Lee, 803 F.2d 322, 324 (7th Cir.
1986) (stating episode is more than mere act but less than scheme).
228. See BLACK'S LAW DICTONARY 555 (6th ed. 1990) (defining event as "the issue or out-
come of an action as finally determined; that in which an action, operation, or series of opera-
tions, terminates").
229. See BLAcK's LAw DICTONARY 25 (6th ed. 1990) (stating that act is "[e]xpression of
will or purpose... a performance; a deed").
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C. Proposed Definition of "Pattern of Racketeering Activity"
The goal of changing the language of section 1961(5) should be
clarity. Accordingly, a new definition of pattern should not merely
codify the test articulated in H.J. Inc. 23 0 The Court admitted that its
explanation of pattern lacked definitiveness and focused its discus-
sion on what did not constitute a pattern rather than providing a
clear definition of the term.
23 1
In order to change the statute's definition of pattern to reduce the
number of unjustified civil RICO suits232 that result from the pres-
ent ambiguous wording, this Comment proposes that section
1961(5) be amended to read as follows:
(5) "pattern of racketeering activity" means at least two events
of racketeering activity
(A) which are related to one another or effectuate the goal(s) of
the enterprise whose purpose or method of operation was the
commission of unlawful acts;
(B) the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding any
period of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior event of
racketeering activity; and
(C) the last of which occurred more than six months after the
first.
For the purposes of this subsection, many illegal acts may con-
stitute a single event.
Using the term "means" adds definitiveness and eliminates the
need to look beyond the codified definition to discern what is neces-
230. H.J. Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2900; see supra notes 90-99 and accompanying text (discussing
test).
231. H.J. Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2899-900.
232. Because the definitions in section 1961 apply to both RICO's civil and criminal pro-
visions, altering the definition of pattern will affect the institution of criminal RICO suits. 18
U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988). The effect will be minimal, however, as DOJ-approved criminal
prosecutions generally involve substantial illegal activity and numerous predicates that would
satisfy a two "event" requirement. See UNITED STATEs ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 14,
§§ 9-110.200, 9-110.340 (1984) (stressing, inter alia, that not every case that technically meets
statute's requirements will result in DOJ approval and that "[n]o indictment shall be brought
charging a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) based upon a pattern of racketeering activity grow-
ing out of a single criminal episode or transaction."); see also United States v. Angiulo, 897
F.2d 1169 (1st Cir. 1990) (affirming Patriarca "Family" members' convictions for conspiracy
to participate and participating in an "enterprise" through "pattern of racketeering activity"
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)-(d) (1988), as well as numerous racketeering, loansharking,
and gambling offenses); United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir. 1990) (affirming
convictions related to dismantling of Philadelphia branch of La Costa Nostra (LCN)). Appel-
lants, members of the Scarfo crime family, participated in a conspiracy lasting 11 years. Id. at
1084-86. The Family's "criminal activities included nine murders, four attempted murders,
drug trafficking, the conduct of illegal gambling businesses, the extortionate collection of
'street taxes' from non-LCN drug dealers and operators of illegal gambling businesses, the
collection of unlawful gambling debts, and the collection of various usurious loans." lMt
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sary and sufficient for a RICO pattern.23 3 The term "event" notifies
potential parties that isolated acts will not form a pattern, and that
many separately indictable or unlawful acts can be combined to con-
stitute one "event." 23 4 Borrowing language used in the Delaware
and Ohio state RICO statutes,235 the word "event" conceptualizes
something larger and more significant than a mere act, therefore
precluding related predicates with the requisite continuity from
forming a pattern if these predicates are in furtherance of only one
"event." 23 6 The word "event" is comparable but preferable to the
word "episode" because it does not carry as much legal "bag-
gage." 23 7 In addition, the term "event" is not so rigid as to fore-
close the flexibility courts need to address the wide variety of facts
with which they are presented.
The first half of the alternative in subsection (A) would codify one
"relationship" standard articulated in H.J. Inc.23 8 Because of the
potential breadth of the Court's "some external organizing princi-
ple" concept, 239 it is omitted from the proposed definition. The
second half of the alternative would require a nexus to an illegal or
illegitimate "enterprise." To the extent that sections 1962(a)-(c)
contain a nexus requirement between the "pattern of racketeering
activity" and the "enterprise," including such a requirement in sec-
tion 1961(5) would be redundant.2 40 Such repetition, however,
serves the two important functions of reasserting RICO's purpose
and increasing the likelihood that the pattern definition will with-
stand vagueness challenges.
233. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1988) (stating what pattern "requires," which may not be
sufficient).
234. For example, 20 mailings to further the sale ofworthless property cannot be charged
as 20 counts of mail fraud-two of which, demonstrating relationship and continuity, would
fulfill the present definition of pattern-because the mass mailing is only one "event."
235. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1502(5) (1985); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.31(E) (Page
Supp. 1988).
236. See H.J. Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2902 (concluding that related predicates, which exhibit
closed- or open-ended continuity, will fulfill pattern requirement while acknowledging that
precise amount of continuity required cannot be fixed in advance).
237. The word "episode," as used in H.R. 511 1's definition of pattern may confuse courts
into requiring multiple episodes which does not appear to be the intention of its drafters
because the word "acts" is retained. See H.R. 5111, supra note 166, at 2 (amending definition
of pattern); supra note 45 (discussing DOJ single episode rule also known as multiple episodes
test).
238. H.J. Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2900; see supra text at note 94 (identifying standard),
239. H.J. Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2900.
240. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(c) (1988) (including nexus for each substantive offense by
forbidding investment of income derived from "pattern of racketeering activity" in an "enter-
prise," acquiring interest in "enterprise" through "pattern of racketeering activity," and con-
ducting affairs of "enterprise" through "pattern of racketeering activity"); see also supra note
225 and accompanying text (identifying seven state RICO statutes that include nexus
requirement).
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Subsection (B) restates the temporal relationship requirement
currently in section 1961(5), but omits reference to the effective
date of the statute.24 1 Subsection (C) codifies the judicial concept of
"continuity." 242 Continuity is established strictly by a minimum
length of time-six months-over which the "events" must ex-
tend.243 This method eliminates the need for the "but for" test
used by the Second Circuit in an effort to apply the open-ended con-
tinuity concept articulated by the H.J. Inc. Court. Specifically, this
method eliminates the need to make tenuous predictions that "but
for" being discovered, the defendant would have continued his ille-
gal conduct. 244
CONCLUSION
H.J. Inc. is the Supreme Court's second attempt to clarify the pat-
tern requirement of RICO. 245 An analysis of the cases decided after
H.J. Inc. reveals that the Court's decision has not adequately defined
RICO's pattern requirement. Because lower court rulings continue
to present inconsistent interpretations of the pattern requirement,
remedial legislation is necessary. Such legislation should go beyond
that which Congress is presently considering and amend the defini-
tion of pattern with tight and unambiguous language in order to
limit significantly the number of inappropriate RICO suits.
Although excising the provision of the statute granting private par-
ties a RICO cause of action would be necessary in order to eliminate
inappropriate uses of private civil RICO, redefining pattern can sub-
stantially limit abuse without eliminating the statute's beneficial
applications.
The definition of pattern proposed by this Comment is based on
the premise that RICO ought to be used to target professional
criminals dedicated to a life of crime. The proposed definition does
not approach mathematical certainty, but its substance and clarity
241. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988) (references in text) (referring to effective date of
Oct. 15, 1970). The effective date, which is no longer relevant, is omitted from the proposed
definition.
242. See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 (establishing continuity concept); H.J. Inc., 109 S. Ct. at
2900 (noting continuity requirements in light of congressional intent).
243. RICO's present definition of pattern contains no comparable provision. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961(5) (1988).
244. United States v. Gelb, 881 F.2d 1155, 1163-64 (2d Cir.) (noting that "but for" de-
fendant's discovery, his scheme to avoid paying postage on mailings would have continued),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 544 (1989).
245. Both the Sedima and H.J. Inc. Courts stressed that Congress, if it is so inclined, may
curtail the broad language that results in unanticipated uses of RICO. Sedina, 473 U.S. at
499; H.J. Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2905; supra note 37 and accompanying text; supra note 99 and
accompanying text.
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will discourage litigation about whether the definition of pattern in
RICO is unconstitutionally vague, provide courts with greater gui-
dance, ensure that defendants receive equal treatment, and reduce
the number of inappropriate suits. In short, this definition will sub-
stantially curb civil RICO abuse that burdens inappropriate defend-
ants and thereby save them, and the judicial system, time and
money.
